O'Flaherty called for aligning Turkey's domestic laws and practices with the European Convention on Human Rights and ECtHR case law. He noted structural problems in the Turkish Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law, internet legislation, NGO oversight, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) structure, detention practices, and the execution of high court rulings.

The report welcomed the inclusion of civil society in the parliamentary commission under the Kurdish peace process, labeled as "Terror-Free Turkey Initiative" by the government, as an opportunity to restore trust in democratic institutions.

Legislation restricting free speech

The commissioner stated that several penal provisions unjustifiably restrict free speech. He raised concerns over the use of the Turkish Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law by courts to limit expression, pointing specifically to articles on insult, insulting the president, degrading the state, and "spreading misleading information."

O'Flaherty urged amendments to Turkish Penal Code Articles 125, 299, 301, 217/A, 215, 216, 220, and 314, calling for the complete repeal of Article 299 on insulting the president.

The report noted that 29 journalists were detained in Turkey at the time of the report's release. 

The commissioner also pointed to regulatory pressures on media through the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) via fines and broadcast suspensions based on vague concepts like "national values."

He called for amending Internet Law No. 5651 and Broadcasting Law No. 6112, noting that over 1.2 million websites and URLs were blocked in Turkey between 2014 and 2024 without independent judicial oversight.

Right to assembly

Regarding the right to assembly, authorities reported 82,220 demonstrations in 2025 with over 32.6 million participants, asserting police blocked only 0.3 percent of the events. 

However, the commissioner criticized the lack of official data on bans and force usage. He highlighted the Mar 2025 protests following the detention of İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu where 1,879 people were detained, 260 arrested, and 468 placed under judicial control. The report also cited restrictions on Pride Week, March 8 marches, and the Saturday Mothers.

O’Flaherty therefore called for Articles 125, 299, 301, 217/A, 215, 216, 220, and 314 of the Turkish Penal Code, as well as the relevant provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Law, to be amended in line with the case law of the ECtHR and the opinions of the Venice Commission. 

Justice system

On the justice system, O'Flaherty criticized the structure of the HSK, noting that the appointment of members by the president and parliament, along with the justice minister's presence, allows executive influence.

He called for reform based on merit and independence. The report also raised concerns over long indictments, parallel trials, and prolonged detentions of journalists and activists.

The report emphasized the need for lawyers and bar associations to operate safely. O'Flaherty met with the İstanbul Bar Association, whose executives faced charges of "terror propaganda" over a Dec 2024 statement. Although acquitted in Jan 2026, the prosecutor appealed.

The commissioner also noted the trial of İstanbul Bar board member Fırat Epözdemir and urged Turkey to sign the Council of Europe Convention on the Profession of Lawyer.

'Deep concerns'

O'Flaherty expressed deep concern over lower courts refusing to implement Constitutional Court rulings, explicitly naming the Can Atalay and Tayfun Kahraman cases, where the Court of Cassation rejected violation judgments. He noted that Turkey has 445 ECtHR judgments awaiting execution, one of the highest numbers among member states.

Finally, the commissioner recommended that Turkey rejoin the İstanbul Convention to address protection gaps in violence against women and reform the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey (TİHEK) to comply with UN Paris Principles. (HA/VK)

With one signature President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shut down one of the foundational private universities of the country by presidential decree. University employees would miss final paychecks; students would be automatically transferred to Mimar Sinan University, which lacked many of their majors; and it was unclear whether graduating seniors would indeed graduate at all. In a country already marked by mass employment and political turmoil this was yet another incursion on daily life. 

That was until a student movement won back their university in three days, cementing a rare, historic victory for the Turkish opposition movement — one won in the streets, rather than parliament, the polls or the courts, which many young people feel has continuously failed them. 

The morning after the announcement about 2,000 students and supporters gathered in and outside the gates of the university. Those outside of campus were eventually allowed entry as numbers escalated and pressure mounted. After a march to the central green space organizers made speeches and read press statements. Students played live music, danced halay and called for an occupation until their university was re-opened. 

Once the environment calmed and the crowd dispersed, students lamented about their futures. Many asked questions and speculated about unemployment, housing, salaries and classes with few answers surrounding the haphazard decree. Moments of gallows humor were followed by laughs, silences, more questions accompanied by more speculation, and political discussions — often marred with sharp criticism of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).  

Friends of mine discussed the campus as a home and an ecosystem, one they took pride in taking care of. 

“Who will feed the cats?” one friend asked me. 

One masters student and university employee, Hatice Anlağan, said that this was the second time this has happened to her. She was a student at İstanbul Şehir University, which the state closed in a similar fashion in 2020. Both closures were near holiday times, likely to quell resistance as students returned to their hometowns. 

“I was warning people about the situation that we might experience in the future,” she said, “I was trying to make them aware of what we are going to face if we don’t stand strong, if we don’t stand against this decision … in a real way. If we can’t, it’s done — it’s over.” 

Anlağan offered thoughts about her experience during open forums organized in empty classrooms in the evening. 

Some students stayed overnight to occupy the campus, but by the third day security cleared them out. It was this third day that was the most eventful, marked by police brutality and teargas, but also demonstrated the resolve of the protestors and perhaps secured their victory. 

Students linked arms and stood across waves of police armed in riot gear. And behind the many rows of officers stood an TOMA, a tank equipped with a water cannon often used to disperse protestors, one of multiple on site. The students hoped to occupy their university, but it was the police who resembled an occupying military force — they behaved like one too. 

Police were the first to break the tension, charging forward in unison. Students were knocked over and some started to flee when a few organizers called on students to stand their ground. Many immediately reversed to hold their lines. Protestors tried to hoist each other up while police kept knocking them down. 

One officer almost seemed to pose for my pictures amidst rounds of battering students with his shield. 

About 15 minutes later police launched tear gas into the crowd. One photographer, much more equipped than myself, had a gas mask ready. I did not, and neither did most of the students, who only had each other, a few surgical masks they never got the opportunity to put on and water bottles filled with crushed Talcid to wash out the chemicals.  

Students’ eyes burned shut and welled with tears. Some screamed in pain and others tried to tough it out. Friends flushed their eyes with talcid-water and fanned their reddened faces. 

One student accompanied by her peers wrapped her arm in a sling with a kefiyeh while sitting on the pavement towards the back. She said the police broke her arm during this first clash, one of a few to come. Atleast 20 students were arrested during these attacks.

The fierce student resistance was not only about their right to an education, but a referendum on dignity and the right to decide their future. The slogans indicated this and also demonstrated a wide representation of political groups and interests coming together to achieve this. 

Some of the most common signs read "Boyun eğme” or “don’t kneel” and also “Ne kayyımın ne AKP'nin, kampüsler bizimdir," or “Neither the trustee nor the AKP, the campuses are ours.” 

Revolutionary socialists shouted “Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Kurtuluşa kadar savaş!" (Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş, war until liberation) in reference to fallen communist revolutionaries. 

LGBTI+ groups chanted “neredesin aşkım, buradayım aşkım” (Where are you my love, I’m here my love). I noticed one guy student zealously chanting it in unison while his friends around him chuckled. It seemed like a sweet, funny moment to me — someone perhaps going out of their comfort zone in this moment led by LGBTI+ organizers in a shared fight. 

All of the students joined together to shout various slogans against the decree and the AKP, and of course, sing the Turkish version of Bella Ciao. During quiet moments students sat on the floor and shared cigarettes, cookies, candies, poğaça and small cups of lentil soup. 

Riot shields demarcated a physical border between this microcosm of a more egalitarian society and the realities of the present, manifested in the hyper-millitarized police and armed tanks that have become a fixture in the lives of many Turkish youth.  

Emir Aydoğan, a representative from the private sector teachers’ union, said that Bilgi University had significant problems around unlawful wages, workers’ rights and high tuition fees prior to the closure. However, they are still fighting for the rights of students and workers. 

“We emphasize that we do not defend Bilgi University as it is … but there were still some egalitarian and libertarian leaning practices, cultural practices and education between students and academics and workers … We defend the university, the part of the university that we create,” he said.  

“We are in a better position after this resistance in terms of fixing the problems of the university before the decree … It was a great victory for the whole of the public of the universities of Turkey as well,” he added.  

He also said that students are the most effective, populous and dynamic element of social struggles, both in Turkey and abroad. The past three days seemed to validate this. 

As night fell and protestors remained unable to infiltrate the campus, organizers had to weigh out risks and make a decision.They announced plans to disband and meet at the same location tomorrow. Just like that the third day was over. 

I rushed to a nearby cafe to download photos and post them before midnight as it was already around 9pm. By the time I shared them, the students had won. The state announced a full reversal of the decision. It was the first time I had ever seen something like this. 

Students were electrified, relieved and yet still harbor complicated feelings about the whole ordeal. And atleast one student remains in custody from an evening house raid following the decree, according to activist groups.

“I still have fire in my chest for how they did this, like suddenly, in one night and in one signature, one man did this — And after three days it’s over, like a joke,” Anlağan said to me. 

One student organizer in a speech during the celebration held at the university the following day said something similar: 

“Even though we are all people from very different backgrounds and with very different views, we won by uniting and resisting. Because we all share a common concern. Our concern is not just the closure of our university. Our concern is that our rights can be taken away overnight, with a single signature, by a single person." 

Until this is no longer the case, we will never be able to guarantee young people in Turkey the future they deserve. (İK/VK)

According to the Islamic lunar calendar, the holiday begins on the 10th day of the month of Dhu al-Hijjah.

Overview of the Constitutional Declaration

Syria's interim constitution, known as the Constitutional Declaration, establishes a five-year transitional framework signed by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The Declaration explicitly grants vast power to President al-Sharaa for a period of five years, without any checks and balances. The President holds executive power as the head of government and Supreme Commander of the armed forces. He appoints one or more Vice Presidents, his Cabinet, and ambassadors, and he also heads the National Security Bureau.

Furthermore, he appoints a committee that will elect two-thirds of the People’s Assembly, the Syrian parliament. He directly appoints the remaining one-third of the assembly. Although the judiciary is declared independent, all seven members of Syria’s highest court, the Supreme Constitutional Court, will be appointed by the President. The former Constitutional Court is abolished. The Declaration is also silent regarding the duration of a judge’s tenure, which is essential for judicial independence. [1]

The Declaration enshrines an impressive list of human rights, including cultural and religious diversity, the right of women to education and work, and freedom of expression, as well as all the rights and freedoms in international human rights treaties ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic. However, many of these rights are not in compliance with other provisions in the Declaration. For example, the right to be free from religious discrimination and the right to freedom of belief are incompatible with provisions requiring that the President must be a Muslim and that Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation. These provisions favor Islam and specifically prioritize Abrahamic religions, meaning Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, rather than granting protections for all beliefs and religious practices.

The Declaration emphasizes the need to preserve the unity and integrity of Syria, its land, and its people. It criminalizes calls for division and secession, and requests for foreign intervention or external support. Article 1 further states that Syria is an indivisible geographical and political unit. Interpretation of these constitutional arrangements makes it clear that the traditional centralist, unitary state approach does not allow any discussion about the possibility of any form of autonomy or power-sharing. [2]

‘It's a recipe for one-man rule’: Syria’s new constitution shatters hopes

25 March 2025

The Declaration from a minorities’ perspective

As seen from the overview above, the transitional period is codified through the Constitutional Declaration, yet the legal status of minorities in Syria remains largely unaddressed. This failure has created significant uncertainty about the future and rights of minorities. In other words, although interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa pledged to protect minorities, the declared constitution and enacted legal framework have faced serious criticism for failing to provide clear, enforceable, and practical protections for religious and ethnic minorities.

Furthermore, the Constitutional Declaration establishes a centralized state under the name "Syrian Arab Republic," recognizes Islamic law as the main legislative source, and declares Arabic as the official language of the country. Besides these provisions, the Declaration stipulates that the president must be a Muslim. These lines demonstrate that the Declaration has adopted Islam as the main pillar of the interim constitution. In Syrian history, the dominant status of Arab identity and Islam in the constitution has served to strengthen the power of the ruling elite while causing significant social, sectarian, and political tensions.

Consequently, this constitutional arrangement has raised significant concerns regarding the rights and safety of religious minorities, such as Christians, Alawites, and Druze, as well as ethnic minorities, like the Kurds, due to the lack of explicit protections and the failure to recognize non-Arab ethnic identities. Additionally, despite the President’s promises of inclusion, religious minorities continue to face targeted attacks, including assaults on Christian churches and retaliatory violence against Alawites.

Meanwhile, as of Mar 2026, authorities in Damascus under the new Islamist-led government have imposed strict bans on the sale and consumption of alcohol in restaurants and bars. As an exception, alcohol sales are restricted to sealed bottles for takeaway in specific, predominantly Christian neighborhoods.

ALAWITES IN TURKEY AND SYRIA

A struggle for identity beyond invisibility and fear

20 May 2025

Minorities are striving for recognition

Minority groups in Syria, including Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians, have actively started demanding formal recognition of their identities, rights, and representation within a new decentralized state structure. As of May 2026, several international media agencies reported that due to constitutional uncertainty, the transitional period has been dominated by political negotiations and conflicts between the government and minorities seeking recognition. The political landscape remains highly volatile, as these minorities face an uncertain future under the new dominant Islamist transitional government.

After raised expectations turned to disappointment during this period, Kurdish political and military leaders entered negotiations with central governments across the Middle East to secure constitutional recognition of their identity, language, cultural rights, and regional autonomy. In January 2026, following intense clashes, the President announced a decree recognizing Kurdish as a national language and restoring citizenship for Kurds. However, despite this formal recognition, the Kurdish language continues to face difficulties in public institutions and education. Officials in Damascus have classified Kurdish as a foreign language. This means Kurdish students in some regions are expected to learn core subjects, like math and science, in Arabic first, rather than using Kurdish as the primary language of instruction. This approach, following the declaration of Arabic as the official language, keeps the legal status of Kurdish restricted to an abstract national language term. Consequently, there is no official equality with Arabic in public affairs, or even in the education of Kurdish students, even in regions dominated by the Kurdish population. [3]

Early in May, the Syrian Justice Ministry removed the Kurdish nameplate from the Hasakah Palace of Justice, replacing it with an Arabic and English one. This intervention sparked massive public outrage and protests across the region, with Kurdish advocacy groups arguing that their language is a core part of Syria's indigenous identity and not a foreign imposition. In short, conflicts over the status of the Kurdish language in public institutions and education are still ongoing and remain unresolved.

Alawites, the dominant minority group under the Assad regime, have been the target of violence and revenge attacks by armed groups and informal militant groups acting on behalf of the new leadership following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. According to figures provided by the UN, massacres have resulted in the deaths of over 1,400 Alawite civilians, and tens of thousands have been forced to flee their homes. UN human rights experts underlined that war crimes may have been committed in predominantly Alawite areas of Syria during a wave of deadly violence earlier this year. Having lost their former status, Alawites are suffering from insecurity and economic deprivation. Many in the coastal heartland fear vengeance and are seeking a safe place within the new political framework. [4]

WITNESSES OF THE SAHEL MASSACRE

Zaynab from Latakia: We just want to live in security and peace

21 March 2025

The Druze community in southern Syria, particularly in Suwayda, has developed a high degree of local autonomy and acts as a buffer zone near the Israeli border. Although there is no unified consensus, the Druze community has maintained a region under the influence of Israel and advocates for a democratic, decentralized Syria. Israel has used military force to defend the Druze minority to establish a buffer zone with a loyal community, aiming to prevent hostile regional powers from gaining ground.

Christian and other religious minorities also seek to preserve their communities' identities against a rising Arab-Islamist regime influenced by HTS. While religious freedom was theoretically promised, Yazidi communities have reported destroyed shrines and fear increased marginalization. [5]

Furthermore, the Declaration explicitly adopts international human rights law, stating that all rights and freedoms stipulated in international human rights treaties, charters, and agreements ratified by Syria are considered an integral part of the document. Although these provisions are theoretically significant for protecting minority rights, the government fails to honor them in practice. This authoritarian political stance has caused widespread disappointment among minorities regarding their future, as conflicts over recognition continue.

Conclusion

Historical experience proves the existence of a close relationship between the legitimacy of political systems and the recognition of minorities and identities. In today's understanding of multiculturalism, cultural differences are not considered a threat, but rather a social asset representing the diversity of a society, serving as the foundation of social peace, stability, and a secure, pluralistic democratic society.

In brief, this existing constitutional structure of Syria, based on a single Arab-Islam cultural group, fails to recognize and instead ignores other cultural groups and identities. This raises questions about the legitimacy of the system and fuels ongoing conflicts. If the permanent Syrian constitution to be drafted after five years fails to accommodate minorities, it may fail to end the ongoing conflicts and the instability of social fragmentation. In order to end these conflicts and establish a peaceful social order, the new constitution must adopt an inclusive approach, designing power-sharing arrangements that recognize all social groups, minorities, and identities.

In other words, to form a democratic structure and bring peace and social order to Syria, the transitional government must accommodate all differences and identities, as they constitute the primary elements of a multicultural social structure. (NT/VK)

References

1)  https://syriaaccountability.org/a-problematic-constitutional-declaration/

2)  https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/2025.03.13%20

3) https://www.kurdishpeace.org/research/kpi-qamishlo/multilingual-education-will-help-syria-s

4)  https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165649

5)  https://newlinesinstitute.org/middle-east-center/preventing-another-sectarian-authority 

Özel, who was removed from office by a court decision on May 21, had previously announced that the rally would take place at Cumhuriyet Square in the CHP stronghold. Following his announcement, the İzmir Governor's Office banned events in that area and stated that the rally could take place in Gündoğdu Square instead.

Despite the restriction, crowds began to gather at Cumhuriyet Square and faced a police blockade. Party supporters continued to arrive at the rally site regardless of the barrier.

Police dispersed citizens in the streets leading to Cumhuriyet Square using water mixed with pepper spray. Water cannon vehicles deployed to each street leading to the square.

Police using water cannon against the crowd:

#İzmir | CHP lideri Özgür Özel'in mitingi öncesi polis, Cumhuriyet Meydanı'nda toplanan yurttaşlara tazyikli su sıkarak müdahale etti. pic.twitter.com/JeGyo3KEDi

— bianet (@bianet_org) May 26, 2026

Despite the intervention, Özel arrived at the area together with his spouse and daughter, marching together with the crowd. He eventually took the floor to address the crowd.

Members of the crowd at the rally expressed anger toward Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who was reinstated by the court as the party leader, chanting "traitor Kemal." They "free leader, free Turkey," referencing Özel's first name which translates to "free."

Various leftist parties also joined the rally.

Özel and his family marching together with the crowd:

#İzmir | CHP lideri Özgür Özel, Cumhuriyet Bulvarı üzerinde yurttaşlarla birlikte yürüyüşe geçti. Kitle, "Gün gelecek, devran dönecek, AKP halka hesap verecek" ve "Direne direne kazanacağız" sloganları attı. pic.twitter.com/XiPpKvfpT4

— bianet (@bianet_org) May 26, 2026

Court removes leadership of Turkey's main opposition party

21 May 2026

Özel demands new congress

In his speech at the rally, Özel challenged Kılıçdaroğlu to hold a new party convention:

“Let’s hold a convention immediately, quickly, as soon as possible. That’s what I’m saying. I say let’s compete with whichever delegates you want at that convention. But there are those trying to avoid holding a convention and drag things out. I’m calling out to Mr. Kemal: I invite him to let our 2 million members elect a party leader within a week or two after the holiday. Let 2 million CHP members elect the party leader!

“If you put the ballot box before 2 million CHP members, I’m a candidate. I’ll run as the last elected general chair.

“Don’t split the party; don’t stop the march to power. Let’s ask the 2 million members—whomever they choose, let’s hold the convention immediately. I will not enter into any compromise that would halt this party’s march to power; I will not bargain with anyone; I will not betray a single comrade; I will not turn back from this path!”

An Ankara court ruled on May 21 that the 2023 party congress where Özel was elected the party chair to end Kılıçdaroğlu's 14-year tenure was null, citing that delegates had been compromised through methods such as vote buying. The court reinstated Kılıçdaroğlu as the chair.

On May 24, police raided the CHP headquarters in Ankara upon the request of Kılıçdaroğlu, after which the ousted administration left the building.

Although Özel was removed from the CHP leadership, he remains a CHP lawmaker and was elected parliamentary group chair by the party's members of parliament.

Police storm CHP headquarters after leadership ouster

24 May 2026

(VK)

In an interview, he says:

“There is a very important and exceptional situation that distinguishes Kılıçdaroğlu from all other political leaders in Turkish political history, especially those who have come to power. Kılıçdaroğlu is a bureaucrat, a high-ranking bureaucrat and technocrat. He joined the Finance Ministry in 1971 and rose through the ranks there, eventually heading Bağ-Kur and the Social Insurance Institution (SSK). Consequently, Kılıçdaroğlu has always acted in a collaborative manner with the state and the establishment, and this has benefited him as a bureaucrat. He took the helm of SSK, one of Turkey’s largest public institutions with over 60,000 employees. Despite being a leftist, the establishment, the state, and the ruling power—under a political structure where Demirel was prime minister and Özal was president—trusted Kılıçdaroğlu. Consequently, Kılıçdaroğlu’s approach as a bureaucrat has always been built on rising through the ranks by collaborating with the system and the ruling power. When I asked him about 2002 and his CHP leadership, he made a very telling remark: ‘When I joined the CHP, I didn’t know what a party was or what party politics entailed.’ This means: He is not someone who understands political party organization. Nor is he a politician who can rally the masses behind him.”

Court removes leadership of Turkey's main opposition party

21 May 2026

In other words, Özkan says, “Kılıçdaroğlu ran against Erdoğan; but he did not establish a genuine political break with the state order Erdoğan had built. Instead of making the people, the organization, and the streets the main force in the march toward power, he invested in approval from within the state, internal system-level compromise, and the ‘emergence of suitable conditions.’”

Again, according to Özkan—and I believe this is the crux of the matter—this bureaucratic background has led Kılıçdaroğlu to perceive power not as something to be wrested from the state through the people’s strength, but as a position the state will “deem appropriate to appoint” once conditions ripen. For Kılıçdaroğlu, politics is an appointment process. And the fact that we are once again discussing “an appointment” in May 2026 is surely no coincidence.

Özkan even went further, stating that Kılıçdaroğlu’s general attitude—which, like a pressure cooker releasing steam, pacifies the opposition into accepting the status quo—has elevated him to the position of “the regime’s leading collaborator.”

Police storm CHP headquarters after leadership ouster

24 May 2026

***

A second context involved certain truths articulated by political scientist Aytuğ Şaşmaz.

According to Şaşmaz, Kılıçdaroğlu has sought to soften the CHP’s classic ‘hardline secularist’ image; through steps like the language of reconciliation, opening up to the right, and the headscarf law, he has aimed to steer the party toward a line that is ‘non-threatening’ to conservative segments. Although he knew what not to do by purging the old elitist cadres, he did not know how to fill the resulting void or what to do. In other words, he thought about the strategy of destruction but not the strategy of construction. As someone unfamiliar with the organization, he avoided engaging in the exhausting and long-term struggle to transform the party organization into a merit-based structure from the grassroots up. He quickly lost hope that the organization could be transformed and abandoned the vacuum within the party to local power centers (delegate networks). By giving up on growing his party’s internal dynamics and its own inherent strength, he expended his energy outward—that is, at the negotiating table, forging “top-down” alliances with other parties. He has become a successful “architect of alliances” but has failed to be a leader who builds his party’s organizational machinery.

***

Now, drawing on these two analyses, perhaps the following point needs to be made.

Kılıçdaroğlu truly acts with a “bureaucrat’s reflex.” He has lived his life believing that the state would constantly “call upon him” and “bring him back.”

Kılıçdaroğlu’s political inaction is not a personal flaw but the inevitable result of a specific understanding of the state-society relationship.

It is highly likely that he views the decision of absolute nullity as “a kind of call from the state.”

According to his logic, the state told him to take up his post. It was the state, not the government, that said this! (But let us emphasize that there is also a concentrated power-oriented mindset embedded within this state.)

Because for him, legitimacy comes not from the will of the people but from the state’s endorsement.

In other words, it can be said that during his 13-year tenure as party leader, Kılıçdaroğlu worked alongside Erdoğan. During this time, he moved forward by convincing “those who trusted him” and repeatedly defusing any momentum that could have shaken the system. That was his function.

Let’s look at this final, absolute case. Kılıçdaroğlu did not engage in any confrontation, did not take any action; he simply waited and held out until the state told him to go.

Imagine a country where the main opposition (in the person of Kılıçdaroğlu) has learned, over decades, to fall in line instead of resisting, to “wait for the right conditions to emerge” instead of winning, and to set up a negotiating table instead of building; this is the failure of an opposition culture. Without dismantling this learned obedience, neither can the CHP be revitalized, nor can the Kurdish issue be resolved, nor can the regime be truly defeated. Because the secret to Erdoğan’s ability to stay in power for so long cannot be explained solely by his own strength; the real reason lies in the fact that the opposition he faces has been shaped by a reflex that waits to be called upon by the ruling power rather than demanding power itself. The fundamental lesson to be drawn from this is that “politics that awaits the state’s approval cannot rally society behind it.” (SB/VC/VK)

Veterinarian Tarkan Özçetin said that the cat and the dog were caught in the middle of heavy tear gas and chaos at the headquarters, but their health is currently good.

"As of now, the general health of both of our dear ones is good. Their regular checks continue," said Özçetin. "Thankfully, no serious health problems occurred. But last night reminded us of one more thing: animals remain the most innocent among human anger and political fights."

Police raided the headquarters yesterday following a court decision on May 21 that annulled the party's 2023 leadership election congress due to irregularities.

Police storm CHP headquarters after leadership ouster

24 May 2026

Court removes leadership of Turkey's main opposition party

21 May 2026

(TY/VK)

Hydrobiologist Levent Artüz said the organism seen on the coast is the compass jellyfish, a species that can be observed along the coasts of Turkey. He added that the species can cause skin irritation due to the stinging cells on its tentacles.

Artüz stated that the compass jellyfish is distributed across the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Sea of Marmara, noting that its presence in the Sea of Marmara is not new.

"Biogeographically, the compass jellyfish is a native species of the Northeast Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean basin," Artüz said. He added that claims suggesting the species was carried to the Marmara region via ballast water from ships do not align with scientific facts.

According to Artüz, the entry of the species into the Sea of Marmara occurred naturally through the two-way current system of the Dardanelles Strait.

'Not an invasion'

Artüz said the first comprehensive hydrobiological studies on gelatinous organisms in the Sea of Marmara were conducted in the 1890s by Russian zoologist Aleksey Alekseyevich Ostroumoff.

Stating that the record of the compass jellyfish in modern literature dates back to 2000 based on sampling from the Erdek Gulf, Artüz said this should not be seen as a new invasion of the species, but rather as the first official academic cataloging date in the modern era.

Artüz listed the primary causes for the species becoming permanent and proliferating periodically in the Sea of Marmara and the İzmit Gulf as human-induced pollution, rising sea water temperatures, overfishing, and eutrophication.

Underwater video reveals return of 'sea snot' in Marmara Sea

18 December 2024

Stating that the discharge of domestic, industrial, and agricultural waste into the sea increases the organic load in the upper water body, Artüz said turbidity reduces light transmittance and increases heating in the upper layer. He noted that these conditions support the reproduction and growth processes of the compass jellyfish.

Artüz also said the decline in pelagic fish stocks that feed on plankton, such as anchovies and sardines, due to pollution and overfishing has weakened the natural pressure on jellyfish.

"These are all developments in the form of a decrease in species diversity and a change in competition conditions depending on the increase in the number of individuals of existing species, which is a typical feature of the second stage of pollution," Artüz said, adding that this is called the Rule of Pessimum Conditions in ecology.

'We do not know the sea we live by the coast of'

Artüz said that the compass jellyfish is in its own natural habitat, stating that the real problem is human-induced pressures on the marine ecosystem.

"This creature has neither a grudge against humans nor a planned attack," Artüz said, adding that the increase in jellyfish is a cycle that can be seen in the Sea of Marmara every year during the spring and summer months.

Artüz criticized the presentation of this situation in the media every year as a disaster encountered for the first time.

"We do not know the sea we live by the coast of," he said. According to Artüz, the increase in the visibility of compass jellyfish should be viewed alongside pollution, overfishing, and the disruption of ecological balance, rather than just the natural cycles of the marine ecosystem. (YÖ/HA/VK)

The top court did not find the entire regulation allowing searches on digital materials during criminal investigations to be unconstitutional, according to the verdict published today in the Official Gazette. However, it annulled certain provisions regarding the seizure of devices for copying computer data and conducting analysis.

The Bursa 1st Penal Court of First Instance brought the challenge in connection with an anti-smuggling case. The local court applied to the Constitutional Court, arguing that certain provisions in Article 134 violated the right to privacy and the protection of personal data.

The objection argued that there were insufficient safeguards regarding which data would be examined during digital searches and copying, how copied data would be protected, how long it would be retained, and how irrelevant personal data would be filtered out.

Digital search 'legitimate'

A majority of the Constitutional Court members did not view searching computers and digital materials as entirely unconstitutional. The court stated that goals such as reaching the material truth in criminal investigations, preventing the loss of evidence, and fighting crime effectively are legitimate.

The ruling noted that computer searches require "strong suspicion based on concrete evidence" and the "impossibility of obtaining evidence by other means." Therefore, the court concluded that the search measure was bound by specific conditions and did not constitute arbitrary authority.

However, the Constitutional Court found provisions regarding the copying of digital data and the seizure of devices for analysis to be unconstitutional.

The annulled provisions allowed for copying all or part of the data on computers, computer programs, and computer files, as well as seizing devices to perform analysis and extract necessary copies.

Insufficient safeguards

The court emphasized that digital devices can contain vast amounts of personal data. The ruling stated that adequate safeguards regarding the protection of data irrelevant to the investigation, retention periods, destruction, return, and effective legal remedies for those concerned were not clearly regulated in digital copying and seizure procedures.

According to the Constitutional Court, this uncertainty creates a risk of disproportionate interference with the right to respect for private life and the right to demand the protection of personal data.

The core of the decision is that access to digital evidence is possible within the scope of a criminal investigation, but it cannot be done in an unlimited and unguarded manner.

The court evaluated the annulled provisions under Article 13 of the Constitution, which covers criteria for restricting fundamental rights, and Article 20, which protects the privacy of private life and the right to protection of personal data.

The court pointed out that procedures performed on digital equipment have a different nature than traditional search and seizure measures. A computer or digital copy can contain not only evidence related to the investigation, but also a large amount of data belonging to the person's private life, communications, professional activities, and third parties.

The seizure of digital equipment has been a problem particularly for journalists, hampering their work due to data loss and the fact that seized equipment is often not returned for months, forcing them to purchase new devices.

Kurdish journalists left without computers after police raid

1 November 2022

Fate of Confiscated Digital Devices on Parliamentary Agenda

11 March 2019

New legislation to be prepared

The Constitutional Court delayed the effective date of the annulment, stating that a legal vacuum could arise if the decision took effect immediately. Accordingly, the annulment provisions will enter into force nine months after the publication of the decision in the official gazette.

During this period, parliament is expected to introduce a new regulation in Article 134 containing new safeguards regarding the copying, retention, filtering, destruction of digital evidence, and legal remedies for those concerned.

Constitutional Court members İrfan Fidan, Muhterem İnce, Yılmaz Akçil, Ömer Çınar, and Metin Kıratlı wrote dissenting opinions against the decision.

The dissenting opinions argued that the current regulation provides adequate protection through judicial decisions, the right to object, and criminal procedure guarantees. The dissenting members did not join the annulment decision, stating that obtaining and protecting digital evidence is mandatory for criminal trials. (Mİ/VK)

The latest decree repeals the one published on May 22:

"Pursuant to a letter from the Presidency of the Higher Education Council, a decision has been made to repeal Presidential Decision No. 11384 dated May 21, 2026, regarding the revocation of the operating license of Istanbul Bilgi University, for which a trustee had been appointed to its founding foundation, in accordance with Additional Article 11 of the Higher Education Law No. 2547."

The closure decision sparked protests from students, who have refused to leave the campus for the past three days. Yesterday, police responded to the protest with tear gas and rubber bullets, detaining several students.

Several detained at İstanbul Bilgi University as students protest closure

24 May 2026

The founding foundation of the university had been managed by a trustee since September following the seizure of Can Holding by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) as part of a large-scale money laundering investigation.

The university's license was revoked in accordance with Additional Article 11 of the Higher Education Law No. 2547, a provision allowing the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) to close a university if the quality of education at the institution is deemed inadequate and the "recommendations and warnings to remedy the situation" are not implemented.

Can Holding seized in major financial crimes investigation

11 September 2025

Former university rector, media executive among 11 arrested in expanding Can Holding investigation

22 October 2025

Established in 1996, İstanbul Bilgi University is one of the country's major higher education institutions and its fourth foundation university.

İstanbul Bilgi University 'Sold' to Holding

4 September 2019

(VK)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ordered the closure of the university through a May 22 decree, which revoked its operating license.

Following the decree, students and faculty members launched a sit-in protest, refusing to leave the Santral İstanbul Campus. University Rector Ege Yazgan visited the protest site at midnight, stating that efforts to ensure a smooth transition were ongoing but announcing that the campus would be closed.

Ill treatment allegations

This morning, a large police team surrounded the campus. A student solidarity network announced that police began intervantion at around noon and detained several students, subjecting them to ill-treatment.

"We have been surrounded," a student said in a video published by the solidarity network. "They pulled our friends by their hair and arms. We were all subjected to torture. Only about 10 of us are left. We will get our detained friends back, we want our school back."

The university previously announced that its students would be transferred to Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, which was desiganted as the guarantor for Bilgi University. However, some departments at Bilgi University, such as engineering, do not exist at Mimar Sinan, leaving the status of those students uncertain.

The closure

The foundation running the university had been managed by a trustee since September as part of the seizure of Can Holding by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) in a large-scale money laundering investigation.

The university's license was revoked in accordance with Additional Article 11 of the Higher Education Law No. 2547, a provision allowing the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) to close a university if the quality of education at the institution is deemed inadequate and the "recommendations and warnings to remedy the situation" are not implemented. (TY/VK)

Police entered the building by cutting through doors with buzzsaws and tearing down makeshift barricades set up by party members. Tear gas and rubber bullets were fired inside as videos showed the area filled with smoke.

#MutlakButlan |🔴CHP Genel Merkezi'ne girmeye çalışan polislere içerideki bir partili yangın tüpü ile müdahale etti. pic.twitter.com/4DxfdZdSkc

— bianet (@bianet_org) May 24, 2026

The party leadership, members, and supporters had been inside the headquarters since May 21, when the court decision was issued.

According to media reports, the ousted leader, Özgür Özel, and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader reinstated by the court, spoke to discuss a transition but failed to reach an agreement. The ousted leadership refused to leave the headquarters. Following this, Kılıçdaroğlu applied to the authorities to request that police enter the headquarters, according to a statement from the Governor's Office of Ankara.

🔴 CHP lideri Özel ve partililer, Genel Merkez binasından ayrılıp Meclis'e doğru yürüyüşe geçti. Polis müdahalesinin ardından bina içinden görüntüler.

📹 Video: @kepenekevrimm pic.twitter.com/yi5ZyWzjXv

— bianet (@bianet_org) May 24, 2026

Özel released a video from inside the headquarters during the incident, where he said, "Our crime was making the CHP the first party of Turkey," in reference to the party's victory in the 2024 local elections.

After police stormed the building, Özel and party executives ledt the building and started marching to the parliament.

The party is also organizing protests in various cities including İstanbul.

Bahçeli calls for settlement between CHP factions after court ousts leadership

22 May 2026

Özel had defeated Kılıçdaroğlu at a congress in Nov 2023, ending his 14-year tenure as the party leader. The faction that lost the election subsequently filed complaints, alleging that delegates were compromised during the election through vote-buying and promises of internal party positions. On May 21, the court ruled that the congress was an "absolute nullity" due to irregularities.

Background

The case traces back to a shift in the leadership of the CHP following the 2023 presidential and parliamentary election, where Recep Tayyip Erdoğan secured his third term as the president.

Kılıçdaroğlu was held responsible within the party for the defeat, after running and losing against Erdoğan in what was widely seen as the most challenging election for him in two decades amid deepening economic troubles.

Following the election loss, İstanbul's now-suspended mayor and a prominent figure in the party, Ekrem İmamoğlu, launched a “change” movement within the party, opposing Kılıçdaroğlu’s continued leadership. Özgür Özel, backed by İmamoğlu, defeated Kılıçdaroğlu at the Nov 2023 congress, becoming the party’s first new leader in 14 years.

Members of the faction that lost control of the party challenged the congress results, alleging irregularities such as buying delegates' votes with cash and party posts. In Feb 2025, an investigation was opened into the congress. Separately, İmamoğlu was arrested in Mar 2025 on corruption-related charges and suspended from office. 

Turkey's main opposition party investigated over vote buying allegations during congress

10 February 2025

Annulment cases filed by various members of the party were merged into a single file at the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance on Feb 14, 2025, and the court held the first hearing on Apr 17, 2025.

There were two dimensions to the case, with one focusing on the criminal elements and the other on the procedural aspects of the party congress. Regarding the criminal aspect, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office indicted 12 individuals, including İmamoğlu, for rigging a vote on Jun 3, 2025, seeking prison sentences from one to three years.

On Oct 24, 2025, the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance ruled that there was no need to render a judgment on the merits regarding the case, on the grounds that the case had become moot. The court also dismissed the merged files, which included the request for the annulment of the Sep 2025 extraordinary congress, due to a lack of hostility. In the 22-page reasoned decision announced on Nov 10, 2025, the court noted that party organs were re-elected at the new congresses and conventions, and that these elections were certified by district election boards, therefore no legal interest remained regarding the old congresses whose annulment was sought.

The decision was subsequently appealed. Examining the file, the Ankara Regional Court of Justice 36th Civil Chamber today ordered the temporary removal of Özel and the party administration, and ruled that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his executive team take over the leadership.

(VK)

Due to its location in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, Turkey is situated in one of the regions where the effects of climate change are felt most acutely. Rising temperatures in recent years, rainfall patterns signaling change, and prolonged heatwaves are making the country’s hydrological balance increasingly fragile. According to data from the General Directorate of Meteorology, the 2024–2025 period stands out as one of the driest phases of the past half-century. During this period, many major cities—particularly Istanbul and Ankara—faced severe water stress, and reservoir levels in many major cities dropped to critical thresholds.

However, the truly critical point is that even the rainy period in 2026 provided only limited relief in many regions. This situation indicates that drought in Turkey is no longer merely a matter of temporary meteorological fluctuations; it points to a more permanent and structural hydroclimatic transformation. Long-term drought index analyses reveal that, particularly since 2018, both the spatial extent and persistence of drought signals have increased significantly. In other words, Turkey is entering an increasingly widespread and chronic aridity regime.

The soil is drying silently

To understand the true extent of drought, looking solely at precipitation amounts is insufficient. This is because hydrological systems do not store and record precipitation instantaneously, but over long time scales. Therefore, soil moisture is one of the most critical indicators for predicting both drought and the resulting changes in wildfire regimes.

Regional soil moisture loss over the past 10 years based on Copernicus data (Prepared by: Bikem Ekberzade).

Analyses based on Copernicus’s latest soil moisture data indicate that a significant moisture loss has occurred across most of Turkey during the 2015–2025 period. It is clearly evident that these losses accelerate further during the summer months and the wildfire season. The drying trend over the past 10 years is also clearly reflected in a decrease of approximately 17.7% in the annual average soil moisture, 19.2% during the wildfire season, and 23.1% during the summer period.

This change is not limited to a mere numerical decline. The decrease in soil moisture increases water stress on plants, alters evapotranspiration processes, and makes forests far more vulnerable to fire. The trend of moisture loss observed in forested areas of the Black Sea Region indicates that fire risk is no longer limited to regions experiencing seasonal drought, such as the Mediterranean Region.

More importantly, ecosystems can no longer compensate for this loss in the short term.

'Drought memory': Nature does not forget the stress it has experienced

The concept of “drought memory” refers to the ability of hydrological systems to carry the stress of past droughts for years.

Our delayed correlation analyses across different time scales reveal that short-term (3–9-month) meteorological droughts weaken relatively quickly; in contrast, long-term hydrological drought signals (24–48 months) can persist in the system for years. Particularly in long-term drought analyses, it shows that water loss in the deeper layers of the soil does not disappear even after a year has passed, and that nature continues to carry this water crisis within itself, despite superficial short-term recoveries.

The practical implications of this situation are quite critical: Forest ecosystems enter the new fire season under water stress despite annual regional rainfall. In other words, the risk does not start from zero every summer; the accumulated hydrological stress from previous years carries over into new fire seasons. Therefore, a single rainy year is not sufficient to eliminate chronic drought conditions.

The carbon dioxide paradox: greener forests, greater risk 

Climate change isn’t just causing a drying effect; it’s also creating a paradox. Rising carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere can temporarily accelerate plant growth in some ecosystems. Forests may appear denser, more closed-in, and “greener.” While this process may seem positive at first glance, it brings a different danger to regions where drought persists: excessive fuel accumulation resulting from increased biomass and subsequent rapid drying.

In other words, more vegetation does not always mean a healthier ecosystem in the long term. Especially in areas where fragmentation of forested areas (due to road construction, infrastructure projects, urbanization, etc.) is significant, this biomass can turn into a massive fuel reserve for large wildfires as long as water stress persists.

The major wildfires that occurred around Bursa, Bilecik, and Eskişehir in 2025, resulting in loss of life, clearly demonstrated just how devastating the consequences of this hydroclimatic pressure can be. Drought, ecosystem degradation, and fire regimes have now evolved into a mutually reinforcing feedback loop: drought and forest fragmentation weaken vegetation cover; weakened ecosystems become more vulnerable to fire; and fires further disrupt soil water-holding capacity and hydrological balance. Unless this cycle is broken, it seems likely that we will face even larger and more destructive fire seasons in the future.

Turkey needs a new fire and water policy

The emerging picture shows that Turkey can no longer address climate risks solely through a “disaster management” perspective. This is because the current approach is largely reactive; that is, it only kicks in after a fire breaks out, dams run dry, or a crisis becomes visible. Yet under the new climate regime, risks manifest much earlier, through accumulations observed in early warning signals.

Therefore, it is now clear that the traditional management approach, based solely on past fire records, is insufficient. To anticipate future risks, it is necessary to jointly assess hydroclimatic trends, soil moisture dynamics, ecosystem stress, forest fragmentation, and the physiological responses of vegetation.

In particular, forested areas—especially those in watersheds, enclosed regions, and karstic zones that support groundwater—as well as old-growth forest systems and all ecosystems with high carbon storage capacity, must now be viewed not only as environmental assets but also as strategic hydrogeological security zones.

(TY/VK)

Bob Dylan wrote this iconic song in 1989, when we may have thought everything was broken but we now know this was not the case. You received letters explaining things to you, businesses and government departments  answered phone calls and you didn’t feel you were being fucked over at every turn. Wind forward to today: Tyrants rule the world; robot AI politely tell you to “do one” and all departments are populated by certified idiots, who would find it difficult to open a crisp packet unaided. Into this visceral terrain, I waged war against my UK bank. I was Che Guevara and I was going to bring them to their knees through justice, Martin Luther King eat your heart out. Supported as ever by wife, who this time took the role of Fidel Castro. My bank said as you live abroad we are canceling your account. I screamed I’m British and fought them on the beaches and lost badly. 

They always know best and speak the truth. Not just the liar in chief in the White House but every one of them. Inflation is perfect deflection. Every time you go to the shops you feel physically robbed, mugged. When once you screamed, I’m home dear carrying eight big bags of delights, now for the same price you come back with one stale bread and cheese which you all have to eat tonight before the sell-by date goes. The news says you’re fine, it’s all getting better. It’s like the Monty Python parrot sketch. The shop owner claims the parrot he’s sold (read the economy) is alive, John Cleese the buyer states only because it’s nailed to the perch (read economy fine only because you say so), “what we have here is a dead Parrot” (economy). 

It is even seeping in here when once the shopkeeper with a pencil behind one ear could solve everything, even he can’t be everywhere. It is now the big companies and they are never wrong. My phone package had not been activated as it usually does and I received a bill with lots of 0’s at the end. “Yeah, we checked it out, we phoned you on.” (You have no record of that.) “Then we later spoke and told you to activate, we have a record of it.” “Can you share it?” “Oh, will look into it,” which means no. “Ok, let’s get it activated go on page BePop 34.” “What!” “At the top you will see a flashing purple bear.” “I can’t see one,” in a whimper. “Screenshot it.” “How?” “Just take a photo.” So I did. “That’s of your cat,” she returns it, the cat looks confused. “I don’t know what to do.” And there, they have you, they are like those spaghetti westerns, all shiny front but behind it is nothing but stashes of idle profit. If you have no financial clout, you are knocked out.

I think I will now converse with Fidel Castro (my wife) to see what our and your next move is.

(To never be continued as agreed by the Federal court ruling of NOW, Mr&Ms X vs the World.)

The closure of the university, which has been under trustee management since Sep 2025 after being seized by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) from Can Holding as part of a financial crimes investigation, was described by students as an abrupt decision that creates uncertainty.

Efforts were made to block graduates who came to support the protest from entering the campus as police were deployed to the university. Police initially blocked entries to the campus but the issue was later resolved through negotiations.

Students said the decision was made without any preparation, dragging the future of thousands of students into uncertainty. Burak Çetiner, head of the İstanbul No. 6 Universities Branch of the Education and Science Workers’ Union (Eğitim-Sen), stated that the struggle against unlawful decisions yields results.

The 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Justice, which handed down the ruling yesterday over alleged irregularities during the 2023 congress, including vote buying, rejected the CHP headquarters' request to lift the interim injunction. 

Separately, the YSK convened to review an appeal against ruling concerning the congress where Özgür Özel was elected. The electoral board also rejected the appeal following its meeting.

The Özel administration will take the case to the Court of Cassation, the top appeals court.

Bahçeli calls for settlement between CHP factions after court ousts leadership

22 May 2026

Atakan Sönmez, the press advisor for Kılıçdaroğlu, confirmed that the former leader would return to the party headquarters.

"Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu will go to the Republican People’s Party headquarters. Have no doubt about this," Sönmez told reporters outside Kılıçdaroğlu's office. Özel had said after the court ruling that he would refuse to leave the headquarters.

"The duties of Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Party Assembly, and all other organs did not begin with the notification just now. Their duty already started the moment yesterday's court decision became final. Today's procedure is a necessary action for the completion of the official protocol. The Party Assembly determined by the 37th Congress and all councils elected there have officially started their duties as of yesterday."

Reactions to court-ordered ouster of CHP leadership

21 May 2026

Later in the day, Kılıçdaroğlu changed his bio on X to "Chairperson of the Republican People's Party." 

His reinstatement is temporary, as he will lead the party to a new congress to replace the one that was annulled.

Background

The case traces back to a shift in the leadership of the CHP following the 2023 presidential and parliamentary election, where Recep Tayyip Erdoğan secured his third term as the president.

Kılıçdaroğlu was held responsible within the party for the defeat, after running and losing against Erdoğan in what was widely seen as the most challenging election for him in two decades amid deepening economic troubles.

Following the election loss, İstanbul's now-suspended mayor and a prominent figure in the party, Ekrem İmamoğlu, launched a “change” movement within the party, opposing Kılıçdaroğlu’s continued leadership. Özgür Özel, backed by İmamoğlu, defeated Kılıçdaroğlu at the Nov 2023 congress, becoming the party’s first new leader in 14 years.

Members of the faction that lost control of the party challenged the congress results, alleging irregularities such as buying delegates' votes with cash and party posts. In Feb 2025, an investigation was opened into the congress. Separately, İmamoğlu was arrested in Mar 2025 on corruption-related charges and suspended from office. 

Turkey's main opposition party investigated over vote buying allegations during congress

10 February 2025

Annulment cases filed by various members of the party were merged into a single file at the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance on Feb 14, 2025, and the court held the first hearing on Apr 17, 2025.

There were two dimensions to the case, with one focusing on the criminal elements and the other on the procedural aspects of the party congress. Regarding the criminal aspect, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office indicted 12 individuals, including İmamoğlu, for rigging a vote on Jun 3, 2025, seeking prison sentences from one to three years.

On Oct 24, 2025, the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance ruled that there was no need to render a judgment on the merits regarding the case, on the grounds that the case had become moot. The court also dismissed the merged files, which included the request for the annulment of the Sep 2025 extraordinary congress, due to a lack of hostility. In the 22-page reasoned decision announced on Nov 10, 2025, the court noted that party organs were re-elected at the new congresses and conventions, and that these elections were certified by district election boards, therefore no legal interest remained regarding the old congresses whose annulment was sought.

The decision was subsequently appealed. Examining the file, the Ankara Regional Court of Justice 36th Civil Chamber on May 21 ordered the temporary removal of Özel and the party administration, and ruled that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his executive team take over the leadership.

(VK)

Global trends of polarization, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, technological changes, and the dominance of major tech platforms further endanger independent and quality journalism. Media activism thus becomes essential to uphold the values of public interest in media and communications.

The purpose of this handbook is to map good practices of media activism to inspire activities for defending public interest in media and communications, including the promotion of media and information literacy.

Download the publication in English here.

A court ruled yesterday that there were irregularities in the 2023 congress of the Republican People's Party (CHP), where the leadership changed. It declared the congress an absolute nullity and ruled that former leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu be temporarily reinstated.

Court removes leadership of Turkey's main opposition party

21 May 2026

While Kılıçdaroğlu welcomed the ruling, current leader Özgür Özel described it as a political "coup" against the CHP.  He said it was driven by anticipation that the CHP will win the next elections, and added they do not recognize the ruling.

Bahçeli, who made a rare live TV apperance on the pro-government broadcaster CNN Türk following the verdict, called on the opposing factions to act calmly to protect the nation's founding party:

"In our opinion, the healthiest way will be to evaluate the issue with coolness, acting in accordance with the law, with a sense of responsibility, and acting with the will to carry the historical and institutional identity of the CHP into the future."

While Bahçeli criticized the court decision for creating "uncertainty," he defended its legal validity:

"With the court decision, it has been accepted and registered by the court decision that Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu was treated unfairly, as claimed. At this point, outbursts like 'We do not recognize the judicial decision' are in vain and unnecessary."

Reactions to court-ordered ouster of CHP leadership

21 May 2026

The MHP leader called on Kılıçdaroğlu to step down as the leader and formulate a joint plan with Özel:

"Collective wisdom must prevail within the CHP. Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu must take on a historic responsibility to ensure he does not harm or wound this long-standing institution—where he served as party leader for 13 years—or cause chaos.

"Within the framework permitted by the law, he should state that he is stepping down in order to meet with Mr. Özgür Özel and formulate a joint plan for the CHP’s future. This outcome will be in the best interest of both the CHP and our country.

"At the same time, by assuming this historical responsibility, Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu will secure a special place in the hearts of both the CHP’s institutional identity and the citizens who have dedicated themselves to the CHP." (AEK/VK)

The university's license was revoked in accordance with Additional Article 11 of the Higher Education Law No. 2547, the decree stated. This provision allows the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) to close a university if the quality of education at the institution is deemed inadequate and the "recommendations and warnings to remedy the situation" are not implemented.

The foundation running the university had been managed by a trustee since September as part of the seizure of Can Holding by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF).

Can Holding seized in major financial crimes investigation

11 September 2025

İstanbul Bilgi University 'Sold' to Holding

4 September 2019

The university had previously stated that if it were to shut down, its students would continue their education at Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University (MSGSÜ), which was designated as the guarantor state university in 2021.

YÖK later issued a written statement, saying it would carry out the process without adversely affecting students and academic staff:

"The Council of Higher Education is taking the necessary measures without delay to ensure that our students do not face any disadvantages and that educational activities continue without interruption.

"The necessary procedures will be carried out without allowing any disadvantages to arise for our students or the administrative and academic staff working at our university.

"Detailed statements regarding this matter will be issued in the coming days. We strongly urge our valued students, their families, and the higher education community to follow accurate and up-to-date information regarding this process exclusively through the Higher Education Council’s official communication channels." (VK)

During a press conference after the ruling, Gürlek noted that the legal process had begun after CHP members' objections to the congress results and the appeal process remains open.

Court removes leadership of Turkey's main opposition party

21 May 2026

“It is of great importance that everyone respects this process, makes their assessments within the framework of the law, and lodges their objections within the legal system.”

“At the heart of this decision lies the direct protection of democratic will. Because regardless of which party is involved, it is unacceptable for the will of delegates and members to be compromised by self-interest, pressure, or manipulation.

“It is particularly important to emphasize that this process began with applications from the delegates of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) themselves; it was shaped by the statements and testimonies of CHP delegates. Judicial authorities also examined the claims, investigation files, witness accounts, and evidence presented to them with meticulous care and rendered their decisions independently and impartially.

“As a result of the evaluations conducted, it was concluded that the will of the delegates was compromised in a manner that influenced the outcome of the convention held on November 4–5, 2023. The court determined that the allegations regarding the provision of benefits or promises to certain delegates undermined the freedom and equality of the electoral process.

“I would like to emphasize here that the judiciary’s duty is to ensure the rule of law. Election security applies not only to general elections but also to the internal processes of political parties. Because political parties are indispensable elements and the pillars of democracy. Any damage to these pillars directly amounts to damage to democracy.

“Therefore, this decision reinforces our citizens’ confidence in democracy and demonstrates that democracy’s self-preservation mechanisms are functioning. A state governed by the rule of law is one that takes allegations seriously and evaluates them based on evidence.

“Of course, the appeal process for this decision remains open. The process will continue to proceed within the framework of the legal system. It is of the utmost importance that everyone respect this process, make their assessments within the framework of the law, and raise their objections within the legal system.” (VC/VK)

Müsavat Dervişoğlu, leader of the Good (İYİ) Party: "We are completely against any kind of undemocratic intervention against the will of the nation. In our eyes, the absolute nullity decision received is itself an absolute nullity!.."

Özgür Çelik, CHP İstanbul Provincial Chair: "We are faced with a new phase of the coup mechanism that started on March 19. They want to destroy the Republic, suspend democracy, and snatch the ballot box from the nation. Our nation will not allow this. Turkey will not bow down to this tyranny. We are on duty for democracy and justice at our İstanbul Provincial Building in Sarıyer."

Prof. Dr. Şule Özsoy Boyunsuz, CHP Party Assembly member: "This decision is null and void. I do not recognize it. My Chairman is Özgür Özel. We absolutely do not accept K.K.’s chairmanship. The chairman of the CHP is Özgür Özel."

Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP): "We Will Resist the Counter-Revolution! We do not recognize the absolute nullity decision given regarding the Republican People’s Party. Our Party Assembly will meet extraordinarily this evening to evaluate the matter in detail."

SOL (Left) Party: "With the absolute nullity decision, a Palace trustee has been appointed to the main opposition party! This is not a party matter; this decision is part of a ballot box setup where Erdoğan is effectively the sole candidate, in an environment de facto without opposition and without elections. We will fight for unity and solidarity against this coup!"

Ümit Özdağ, leader of the Victory (Zafer) Party: "I am canceling the three-day Antalya program that I started an hour ago in Serik, Antalya, and returning to Ankara. The absolute nullity decision on the CHP is a blow dealt to democracy. The Victory Party bureau will meet this evening at 8.00 pm under the chairmanship of Prof. Dr. Ali Şehirlioğlu. We will hold the second meeting tomorrow at 11.00 am under my chairmanship."

European Greens: "After last year's imprisonment of İstanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, as well as hundreds of other opposition members, this is part of a broader pattern of political instrumentalisation of the justice system. In a democracy, the government cannot replace elected leaders of opposition parties. Political competition takes place at the ballot box and within democratic institutions - not by dismantling opposition parties.

"Erdoğan is pushing the country further toward autocracy. We stand by the people of Turkey and call for an immediate, clear and firm reaction from the European Commission and Council. The EU cannot remain silent while democratic standards are deteriorating before our eyes in a candidate country, but defend fundamental rights and the rule of law." (VK)

Former leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his executive team will take over the party leadership temporarily, according to the verdict reached by 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Justice.

The case has been ongoing since 2024 over allegations of irregularities, including vote-buying, during congress where the new leadership wae elected, ending Kılıçdaroğlu's 14-year spell.

The court also annulled an extraordinary congress held by the CHP in September while this case was ongoing, which aimed to secure the leadership's position regardless of the trial's outcome.

The ruling is open to appeal.

CHP re-elects leader in emergency congress to avoid 'judicial takeover'

21 September 2025

Reactions from Özel, İmamoğlu

After the ruling, hundreds of CHP members gathered outside the party headquarters in İstanbul and Ankara to protest the ruling. Crowds also chanted against Kılıçdaroğlu, calling him a "traitor" for accepting the decision.

CHP leader Özgür Özel responded to the ruling in a statement on social media:

"I am not promising you a path to power through a rose garden. I am promising you that we will endure the pain, but we will not surrender. I am promising you honor, dignity, courage, and struggle!"

Ekrem İmamoğlu, the suspended mayor of İstanbul who remains in custody following his detention last year on corruption charges, also released a statement on social media calling the ruling "null and void."

"This is not merely a coup against the CHP; it is a coup against Turkey, democracy, and the Republic. It is an attempt to destroy the constitutional order.

"The matter is serious. It transcends party lines. It is time for the nation to stand up for Turkey."

Kılıçdaroğlu welcomes decision

Kılıçdaroğlu welcomed the decision, telling the pro-government broadcaster TGRT Haber, "May it be beneficial for the party."

He later released a statement on social media:

“The Republican People’s Party is the charter of our nation’s sovereignty. The court’s decision regarding our 38th Ordinary Congress should not be a cause for division, but rather an opportunity to unite under the shade of our century-old plane tree. Today is not a day to tear each other apart with shouts of joy. Today is the day to set aside grievances and rise up with seriousness, calmness, and unity. We must manage this process not with ‘what-ifs,’ but with seriousness, the sincerity we draw from our party culture, and collective wisdom.

“It is not personal advancement that matters, but the future of Turkey. In this context, we will carry out this process in full harmony and cooperation with our former Party Chairpersons, Party Council members, Members of Parliament, and provincial and district chairpersons. Let no one worry; we will guide our party through these discussions and continue our march toward power. I call on everyone to remain calm and act with collective wisdom. We stand united.”

Yesterday, he released a video on social media criticizing the current leadership and calling for "cleansing."

Throughout the process, Kılıçdaroğlu and party figures close to him publicly accused the current administration of wrongdoing on several occasions, regarding both the party congress and a widespread corruption crackdown on party-run municipalities, which saw more than 30 mayors suspended and arrested.

Thirty-one opposition mayors removed from office since 2024 elections

2 April 2026

The CHP leadership views these legal processes as politically motivated, describing them as an attempt to take revenge on the party after its success in the 2024 local elections, where it managed to significantly surpass the ruling AKP for the first time in its 24-year rule.

Bahçeli says court should remove opposition leadership

9 September 2025

Background

The case traces back to a shift in the leadership of the CHP following the 2023 presidential and parliamentary election, where Recep Tayyip Erdoğan secured his third term as the president.

Kılıçdaroğlu was held responsible within the party for the defeat, after running and losing against Erdoğan in what was widely seen as the most challenging election for him in two decades amid deepening economic troubles.

Following the election loss, İstanbul's now-suspended mayor and a prominent figure in the party, Ekrem İmamoğlu, launched a “change” movement within the party, opposing Kılıçdaroğlu’s continued leadership. Özgür Özel, backed by İmamoğlu, defeated Kılıçdaroğlu at the Nov 2023 congress, becoming the party’s first new leader in 14 years.

Members of the faction that lost control of the party challenged the congress results, alleging irregularities such as buying delegates' votes with cash and party posts. In Feb 2025, an investigation was opened into the congress. Separately, İmamoğlu was arrested in Mar 2025 on corruption-related charges and suspended from office. 

Turkey's main opposition party investigated over vote buying allegations during congress

10 February 2025

Annulment cases filed by various members of the party were merged into a single file at the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance on Feb 14, 2025, and the court held the first hearing on Apr 17, 2025.

There were two dimensions to the case, with one focusing on the criminal elements and the other on the procedural aspects of the party congress. Regarding the criminal aspect, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor's Office indicted 12 individuals, including İmamoğlu, for rigging a vote on Jun 3, 2025, seeking prison sentences from one to three years.

On Oct 24, 2025, the Ankara 42nd Civil Court of First Instance ruled that there was no need to render a judgment on the merits regarding the case, on the grounds that the case had become moot. The court also dismissed the merged files, which included the request for the annulment of the Sep 2025 extraordinary congress, due to a lack of hostility. In the 22-page reasoned decision announced on Nov 10, 2025, the court noted that party organs were re-elected at the new congresses and conventions, and that these elections were certified by district election boards, therefore no legal interest remained regarding the old congresses whose annulment was sought.

The decision was subsequently appealed. Examining the file, the Ankara Regional Court of Justice 36th Civil Chamber today ordered the temporary removal of Özel and the party administration, and ruled that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his executive team take over the leadership.

(VC/VK)

The title of the exhibition, created through a typographic intervention, questions the concepts of shelter and sheltering at the same time. It invites viewers to reflect on cohabitation in the city, the right to shelter, and interspecies solidarity. The project raises questions about what the right to shelter means, who can and cannot shelter in the city, whether shelters are a sanctuary or an isolation zone for animals, and how living spaces opened or closed by human hands are shaped.

Participating artists include Özge Akdeniz, Ozan Atalan, Vahap Avşar, Melis Baçaru, Beyza Boynudelik, Cins, Yağmur Çalış, Bekir Dindar, Alea Pınar Du Pre, Çağdaş Erçelik, Arzu Ertekin, Güler Güçlü, Osman Gültepe, Seydi Murat Koç, Mehmet Sinan Kuran, Burak Kutlay, Gönül Nuhoğlu, Tuğba Öztopçu, Lebriz Rona, Ezgi Sandıkçı, Gonca Sezer, Nilüfer Şatana, Erkut Terliksiz, Cansu Yıldıran, Çiğdem Yıldırım, İpek Yücesoy, and Baysan Yüksel. Some artists produced new works specifically for the theme, while others contributed existing pieces.

As part of the exhibition, artist talks will bring participants together with the audience to discuss their works and the project process. Workshops will cover animal rights-themed art activities for both children and adults. At the end of the exhibition, the artists will connect their works with collectors on their own initiative. The support generated from these meetings will directly purchase supplies on the urgent needs lists of the Beşiktaş Municipality Shelters and Angels Farm.

The exhibition is open free of charge at Müze Gazhane Hall P from May 21 to Aug 31, 2026. Visitors can attend from 10.00 am to 6.00 pm local time (GMT+3) every day except Mondays. (TY/VK)

Fourteen suspects, including singer Mabel Matiz, have already been detained. Mabel Matiz was recently acquitted in a case where they stood trial on "onbscenity" charges over song lyrics.

Several celebrities detained in drug investigation

18 December 2025

Journlist Mirgün Cabas, who is also on the list, said on social media that he learned about the investigation from the press this morning. 

"I lost my father yesterday, and I am in İzmir for my father's funeral. My lawyers are meeting with the investigative authority, and I will do what is necessary once I have information. Do not worry," he wrote.

The Bakırköy Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office released a statement regarding the operation, noting that the investigation targets individuals who facilitate drug use, provide venues, or consume drugs:

"Within the scope of the fight against drugs that threaten public health and safety, in investigations carried out by the Bakırköy Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, recently carried out operations by our law enforcement forces, which were also reflected in the public, seized a high amount of cocaine intended to be smuggled into our country from abroad by sea before it reached land."

More celebrities detained in narcotics, prostitution probe

17 February 2026

The statement added that drug manufacturing facilities were identified, multiple drug dealers were arrested in different districts of İstanbul, and illicit substances and criminal objects were seized.

The operation includes searches of the suspects' residences and drug tests, according to the statement.

Over the past year, authorities have launched narcotics investigations targeting numerous well-known figures, including celebrities, journalists and businesspeople. These probes have resulted in drug tests and multiple arrests. (EMK/VK)

Bozfırat accused the media workers struggling for their unpaid wages of "threats," "slander," "inciting the public to hatred and hostility," "violating the privacy of private life," "unlawfully giving or acquiring data," and "disturbing the peace and tranquility of individuals," according to the report.

The file claimed that some employees of KRT TV, owned by Fırat Bozfırat, publicly shared video recordings regarding salary payments, that these posts contained incomplete and misleading information, and that the commercial reputation of the owner was damaged.

Court blocks access to news about journalists' wage protests at KRT TV

24 July 2025

The posts were defined in Bozfırat's application as "provocative, containing threats, slander, and incitement of the public to hatred and hostility, and violating his private life." The application claimed, "It is clear that such public and misleading posts fail good-faith resolution efforts and harm our client's corporate reputation."

News reports and posts by news websites that made the voices of the media workers heard, including Evrensel, BirGün, T24, Medyascope, Cumhuriyet, and soL, were also presented as evidence in the criminal complaint.

BIA Media Monitoring Reports

13 December 2024

'Attempt to criminalize sseking rights'

One of the KRT employees, Fatih Yapıcı, stated that their struggle for rights continues in the court process. "Only my two-month salary receivable was paid, the promises made were not kept," he said, describing the complaint as an attempt to "criminalize seeking rights."

Recalling the confession of the company lawyer at the time, who said, "I cannot deceive you any longer," Yapıcı said, "Our struggle for rights that we started continues at the courthouse doors one year later. The channel was locked down, workers were first put on unpaid leave and then completely dismissed. While two of our salaries were paid in installments during this process, we continued to seek our rights in court for our other receivables, including meal money."

Background

The process started after 158 media workers employed at KRT were not paid their salaries and meal fees for two months and the editorial process was not run properly, turning into a work stoppage on Jun 4, 2025.

The employees used their right to "refrain from working," stopping the broadcast of the channel and switching to recorded broadcasting.

The resistance concluded with gains on its 21st day. A portion of the payments was made, while the rest was tied to a schedule. However, KRT employees say that despite approximately one year having passed, the promises made have not been kept.

Additionally, KRT TV owner Fırat Bozfırat was the subject of the news stories during the process. The reports drew attention to Bozfırat's close relations with ruling circles.

Bozfırat also had access to news reports regarding the salary protest of the employees and criticisms against the management blocked by a court decision on grounds of "national security" and "public order."

The prosecution requested that Ersoy be penalized for "establishing and managing a criminal organization," "qualified sexual assault (11 counts)," "trafficking or supplying narcotics or stimulants," and "facilitating the use of narcotics." Ersoy faces up to 65 years and three months in prison.

The indictment has been sent to the İstanbul 19th Heavy Penal Court.

According to the indictment, Ersoy is alleged to be the leader of a criminal organization. He is accused of dragging women into an exploitation network by supplying them with cocaine.

The indictment stated that members of the organization systematically introduced women in their circles to Ersoy, believing he had connections with influential people. The members allegedly established emotional bonds with these women and directed them into relationships with Ersoy using various methods.

Several celebrities detained in drug investigation

18 December 2025

Background

Ersoy, who was the editor-in-chief of Habertürk, a main stream news channel, was detained on Dec 9, 2025, during a gendarmerie operation.

The operation followed the seizure of Habertürk and Can Holding by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) amid a separate investigation into "tax evasion" and "fraud."

Ersoy was initially accused of using narcotics, facilitating their use, and establishing an organization to commit crimes. He was arrested by a court on Dec 10.

Following his detention, a former colleague had accused Ersoy of sexual assault and harassment.

Ersoy's drug test following his detention returned positive.

Over the past year, narcotics investigations have been launched in Turkey targeting numerous individuals, including celebrities, businesspeople, and influencers. These investigations have resulted in drug tests and arrests.

More celebrities detained in narcotics, prostitution probe

17 February 2026

(HA/VK)

Following the intervention, the Human Rights Association (İHD) İzmir Branch called on law enforcement and private security units to "abandon violence, detention threats, physical blockades, and discriminatory practices."

The association urged the university administration, law enforcement, and private security guards to act in accordance with the law, human rights, and the prohibition of discrimination.

In recent years, virtually all LGBTI+ activities in Turkey, including pride marches, have faced bans.

The İHD statement concluded with the words, "Pride cannot be banned; LGBTI+s are not alone."

MUBI Fest censorship latest in a series of bans targeting LGBTI+s in İstabul's Kadıköy

8 November 2024

PRIDE MONTH

LGBTI+ 'tea gathering' banned in İstanbul

16 June 2023

(NÖ/VK)

The İstanbul 69th Penal Court of First Instance found the students guilty of "damaging public property" due to writing slogans on the walls Birlik Park and on outdoor equipment cabinets belonging to Türk Telekom in Beşiktaş, İstanbul. The court deferred the announcement of the verdict.

According to the indictment prepared by the İstanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, the students used spray paint around Mar 26, 2025, on Nisbetiye District Park Street to write on the Türk Telekom cabinets and certain areas inside Birlik Park. The slogans included "Wake Up İstanbul," "Consumer Eye is a Boycott," and "Students Are Not Alone."

İmamoğlu was detained alongside dozens of municipal officials in March last year, sparking nationwide protests that lasted for days. Following his detention, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) declared him its presidential candidate for the next election. He remains in custody as his trial continues.

Over 100 youths released after mass arrests during İmamoğlu protests

10 April 2025

Municipality and Türk Telekom report no damage

The Beşiktaş Municipality and Türk Telekom, listed as complainants in the case, stated in their submissions to the court that no damage occurred. Both institutions announced that they were not filing a complaint against the students.

In their defense, the students said the paint used was water-based, they had no intention of causing permanent damage, and they cleaned up the writings themselves later.

One defendant explained that they did not act with the intent to damage public property, noting that the paint was easily erasable. Another student stated that they cleaned the writings about one week after the incident.

Lawyers for the students argued that the material element of the crime did not exist, recalling that both the Beşiktaş Municipality and Türk Telekom reported no damage.

The court, however, ruled it was established that the students committed the crime of "damaging public property."

The reasoned decision stated that despite the Beşiktaş Municipality writing that "there is no public damage," writing on areas designated for public use is considered under the qualified form of the crime of damaging property.

The ruling noted that "defacement" can manifest as writing slogans, drawing pictures, or pasting posters or advertisements on the walls of a building belonging to someone else. (NÖ/VK)

In a ruling delivered last month, the court examined work orders sent to employees via WhatsApp after the end of working hours and concluded that digital correspondence outside of working hours must be included in working time and ordered overtime pay for the employee.

The court based its decision on specific criteria regarding overtime work. These included messages carrying direct work orders and instructions, continuous correspondence pressure placed on the employee, and systematic assignments made after working hours.

Digital records have increasingly become the subject of lawsuits in labor courts since the pandemic, as remote work has become more common. 

According to the provisions of Labor Law No. 4857, all work exceeding 45 hours per week is considered overtime. The hourly wage for overtime work must be paid at a rate 50 percent higher than the regular hourly wage. (VK)

The epicenter of the tremor was located in the Gülümuşağı area of Battalgazi, according to information on the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) website of the. The earthquake occurred at a depth of 7.03 kilometers.

Due to the earthquake's proximity to the surface, the shaking was felt strongly, accordingt to reports in the local media.

The tremor was also felt in surrounding provinces, particularly Adıyaman.

Malatya Governor Seddar Yavuz said, "We have not received any reports of negative developments so far," as quoted by Anadolu Agency (AA).

Malatya was one of the 10 cities devastated by the twin earthquakes centered in Maraş in Feb 2023.

Powerful earthquake strikes Turkey's Malatya, one of the cities devastated by February 2023 quakes

16 October 2024

(VK)

Erol Türksever, 46, was trapped under rubble while working in the mine located in the Dilaver neighborhood of the central district. Emergency teams and police were dispatched to the area following an emergency call.

Türksever was removed from the mine and taken to the Zonguldak Atatürk State Hospital after receiving initial medical treatment on-site. He succumbed to his injuries despite medical interventions.

Mine collapses in Zonguldak, one worker loses his life

7 April 2021

Türksever was working at the mine alongside his son.

Authorities have launched an investigation into the incident. The mine where the collapse occurred had reportedly been previously identified and shut down by the gendarmerie.

Police have started efforts to apprehend E.K., who is identified as the owner of the mine.

More than six workers killed on the job every day in April

6 May 2026

(NÖ/VK)

The incident occurred on May 12 at around 5.50 am. The mother, father, and three children aged 15, 14, and 9 were at home during the raid.

Police actions 'amount to torture'

The family's lawyer, Yusuf Çakas, told bianet that they will meet with the prosecutor tomorrow.

"A medical report is available, and we will follow up on this until the end," Çakas said.

Çakas claimed that the intensity of the violence increased when one of the police officers saw the Kurdish word "azadi," which means freedom, written on the child's arm cast.

"There is an injury here that exceeds intent and amounts to torture, and the preservation of impunity. This is not just a problem of entering a faulty house. There is a reflex against the Kurdish word written on the child's arm," Çakas said.

According to photographs seen by bianet, the child sustained bruises across his body.

'Sound bomb thrown inside the home'

In his statement as a complainant, the father described the moment of the raid.

"While I was sleeping, an extremely loud noise came and I suddenly got out of bed. When I looked at the corridor, the entrance door was broken and a sound bomb was thrown inside. With the bomb thrown inside, a high light and sound came out," the father said.

According to the father's statement, masked special operations police officers entered the house after the sound bomb exploded.

He said that he and his two sons were forced to lie on the ground and handcuffed behind their backs.

He recounted that an officer stepped on his back with his foot, whereupon one of his children shouted, "My father is a lung patient, he has a psychological disorder, do not touch my father."

The same statement included the allegation that a special operations police officer threatened the family, saying, "Do not make a sound, nobody make a sound, I will shoot you."

Police left after realizing they raided the wrong home

According to the family's statement of complaint, police officers asked about a specific individual, and one of the children responded that the person lived upstairs.

The father stated that the special operations police then left the house without conducting a search, and the incident took place within 7-8 minutes.

According to the father's account, after the special operations police left the house, an officer who identified himself as narcotics police came to him.

This officer told him, "There was a mistake, they entered the wrong house, we apologize, we will cover whatever financial expenses you have."

The father said that he later saw his 14-year-old child lying on the ground with a bleeding nose. The child's right arm was already in a cast because it had been broken previously while doing sports.

After the incident, the child told his family that he had pain in his left arm and could not move either arm.

Child hospitalized

The child was taken to Bingöl State Hospital, where a fracture was detected in his left arm due to the physical violence applied.

The child was later referred to an ear, nose, and throat doctor due to swelling in his nose. His treatment was completed in the evening hours.

Upon the issuance of a forensic report, the hospital police directed the family to the Child Bureau Directorate.

The family declared that they would file a complaint after going to the Provincial Police Department.

The father expressed his complaint submitted to the police. "I am filing a complaint and a lawsuit against the Special Operations Police who entered my house by mistake to search it, damaged my property, and injured my son. Since their faces were masked and covered, I cannot identify the police officers." (NÖ/VK)

Ayaz, right holder of the local outlet Aydınpost, had recently written two articles about the allegations. Detained on May 15, Ayaz was formally arrested  on charges of "publicly disseminating misleading information" under Turkish Penal Code Article 217/A.

Another journalist detained within the scope of the investigation, Emin A., was released under judicial control measures.

In her first article published on Apr 20, Ayaz brought the allegations to her column under the title "Knives at school, weapons in allegations: What is Aydın hiding?"

Ayaz published a second article on May 14, claiming that the allegations were confirmed based on complaints filed by other students at the school to the Presidential Communications Center (CİMER).

Prosecutor's office denies allegations

Following the arrest, the Aydın Chief Public Prosecutor's Office issued a written statement arguing that the allegations did not reflect the truth. It stated that the photograph subject to the CİMER applications belonged to a "toy gun" incident that took place at a private school in 2024, and that the parent of the student in question was not a public official or a lawmaker.

The office also claimed that some individuals filed applications to CİMER to "save suspects from crime" by creating evidence in their favor.

The office accused the journalist of making false and misleading news by exploiting the public sensitivity caused by two rare school shootings that took place in the country last month.

Nine killed in second school shooting in Turkey in two days

15 April 2026

Response to prosecution's statement

Ayaz responded to the prosecutor's office with an article she wrote from prison, which was published today on Aydınpost.

Ayaz noted in the article that she was arrested solely for her reporting on allegations that had already been circulating in the local press.

She said that after the news of her detention, a parent contacted her via social media to confirm the cover-up, which was later supported by five official CİMER complaint documents filed by four students and a parent.

According to Ayaz, these documents asserted that an armed student had pointed a gun at classmates, that photographic evidence existed, and that the school administration had actively covered up the incident.

Ayaz added that she independently verified the identity of the lawmaker's son in the photograph but chose not to publish it because he is a minor.

Ayaz criticized the Aydın Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office for declaring the CİMER complaints "fake" without taking statements from the applicants. She also questioned how the prosecutor's office was able to determine that the weapons in question were actually pellet guns.

BIA Media Monitoring Reports

13 December 2024

Furthermore, she pointed out a chronological discrepancy, noting that while the prosecutor's office claimed the incident occurred in 2024, all official CİMER complaints explicitly dated the event to 2025.

The journalist also questioned the integrity of the investigation, highlighting that the prosecution relied entirely on statements from the school administration, which was the very institution accused of covering up the allegations.

She challenged authorities to release the image publicly, announcing that Aydınpost would submit the photograph to independent experts to verify the identity of the individual holding the weapon.

Reactions from journalism groups

Journalism organizations reacted to the arrest of Ayaz. The İzmir Journalists Association (İGC) made a press statement regarding the arrest, calling it unacceptable.

"This incident is one of the signs that the pressure on journalism has reached unimaginable points," the association said. "Instead of silencing the journalist who points to a great danger, the great danger pointed out by that journalist should be stopped and investigated in detail."

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Turkey Representative Erol Önderoğlu was also among those who reacted to the arrest.

"Arresting a journalist for disinformation and intervening in the agenda over every news item that has a dimension related to the powerful has become a worrying habit of the judiciary," Önderoğlu said, stating that the arrest was arbitrary and unacceptable.

'Disinformation law' used against journalists

The law on "publicly spreading misleading information," which passed parliament in October 2022 with assurances that it would not be used against journalists, has increasingly become a tool used in investigations and lawsuits against members of the press.

Under the article publicly known as the "disinformation law," 83 journalists have been investigated, detained, arrested, or prosecuted since its enactment.

The charge has been leveled against journalists 114 times, resulting in 54 investigations and 39 lawsuits. The law has led to 11 detentions and 10 arrests based on this accusation.

'Disinformation law' used against 83 journalists since 2022

10 April 2026

(HA/VK)

In statements published yesterday in the Türkgün newspaper, Bahçeli said the process has entered a new phase and requires a new roadmap. He suggested including Öcalan in the process under a new status, while maintaining his imprisonment.

PKK announces withdrawal from Turkey, marking ‘next phase’ in peace process

27 October 2025

Bahçeli argued that a multiplicity of voices within the leadership mechanism during the liquidation of militant groups could pave the way for splinter organizations. To prevent this, the interlocutor must be clearly identified, he said.

"Equipping Öcalan with a social status, while keeping his conviction status reserved, will make it possible to conduct the organizational activities or disarmament of the dissolved PKK and its components in a healthier manner," Bahçeli was quoted as saying. "The 'Peace Process and Politicization Coordinatorship' could be an appropriate description of status in this direction."

INTERVIEW WITH MP CENGİZ ÇANDAR

'Turkey's peace process will gain momentum after Damascus-SDF agreement'

9 February 2026

The coordinator mechanism would be limited exclusively to the disarmament and organizational liquidation of the PKK, he added. 

"The coordinatorship is envisioned for the purpose of coordinating the absolute disarmament and liquidation of all extensions, organization managers, and militants of the PKK terrorist organization, preventing the ongoing peace process from being disrupted in its organizational aspect, and making legitimate guidelines appropriate for choosing politics instead of weapons."

Bahçeli, who made a similar proposal earlier this month, stated that the political, legal, and social conditions to make this process possible exist in Turkey.

Peace process

The peace process in Turkey began in Oct 2024 after Bahçeli, a key ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, suggested that Abdullah Öcalan could be released by benefiting from the "right to hope" in exchange for dissolving the PKK.

The PKK decided to dissolve itself in May of last year, and the group now uses the signature "Apocu movement management" in its statements. The organization also held a symbolic disarmament ceremony last July.

Additionally, a parliamentary committee was established and completed its work at the end of last year to determine the framework for legal regulations within the scope of the peace process.

A waypoint on the path to peace: What does the commission report say?

28 February 2026

However, no other concrete progress has occurred in the process. The Kurdish side states that legal regulations must be implemented and Öcalan must benefit from the right to hope for the process to advance.

Meanwhile, observers suggest that the parties prefer to wait due to regional developments, including the integration process in Syria and the war led by the US and Israel against Iran. (VK)

Dec 24, 2025. Şirinköy in the Kilimli district of Zonguldak. Tülay Ündeş, 45, and her mother, Zaide Alkaç, 64, are returning from visiting a patient. In the middle of the street, Yusuf Ü., the man Ündeş was in the process of divorcing, kills them both with a firearm. The fleeing perpetrator is caught and placed in prison.

The case concludes in a short period of three months on May 14. The Zonguldak 2nd Heavy Penal Court sentences the male perpetrator to two counts of aggravated life imprisonment. Moreover, no reductions are applied.

When looking at femicide cases in Turkey, considering the men who are often rewarded with reductions based on grounds such as "good behavior," wearing a "suit," or "remorse," this decision may seem important at first glance. It is indeed important, but it is not enough. Because the lack of a reduction does not change the fact that the murder was committed in a planned manner.

The accounts of the family and Hande Göndoğdu, one of the lawyers from the Association for Children and Women First who followed the case, show numerous details suggesting a planned murder rather than "sudden anger."

For instance, the weapon.

Just before the murder, the perpetrator purchases a weapon via Facebook. When asked in court why he bought the weapon, he says, "I was afraid the woman's family would kill me." However, there is no death threat, threat of violence, or any behavior indicating this from the family in the case file. On the contrary, there are messages the perpetrator sent to his wife, Tülay Ündeş, whom he killed: "Your father does not have the heart; if he did, he would face me."

On one hand, he says he was afraid, and on the other, he challenges them.

If that is not enough, he says during the hearing, "I had an interest in hunting." Yet, witnesses and his children explain that he had no such interest. He gives contradictory statements regarding the serial number of the weapon. He says, "It was already erased when I bought it."

According to the court, all of this is not enough for premeditated murder.

Then what is the answer to this question?

If the weapon he carried was the result of an "interest in hunting," why was it right at hand the moment he saw the woman he claimed to love on the street? According to camera records, the weapon is not taken out of the trunk. He gets out of the vehicle with the weapon. And he kills two women within 19 seconds.

Nineteen seconds.

The defense of the perpetrator is of a familiar kind: "They provoked me," "I got angry," "I had a temporary breakdown." This is the common language of men who kill women in Turkey. Women die, men narrate "a moment of anger." Women enter the ground, men say "I loved her."

The sentence "I loved my Cano very much" that he spoke during the hearing is just such a thing. One of the most familiar sentences of male violence established under the name of love.

What lawyer Hande Göndoğdu said is very striking: "Even while I was explaining this in court, 27 seconds passed. How can an argument take place and a breakdown occur in 19 seconds?"

Because there is no footage of an argument. There is no "moment of anger." There is preparation. There is a weapon. There is tracking. There is a history of threats.

Oh, and there is a protection order.

Tülay Ündeş, like many murdered women, was a woman who had applied to the state for protection. A protection order had been issued for her. She is killed approximately four months after the expiration of that order.

Women usually tell the state "protect me" before they are killed anyway. But protection orders in Turkey often do not protect women; they merely delay the responsibility of the state for a limited period.

For this reason, the family filed a criminal complaint against public officials who were negligent, particularly the gendarmerie. The result? A decision of "no grounds for prosecution."

This might be one of the fastest-working mechanisms in femicide files in Turkey: the mechanism protecting public officials.

A woman requests protection. She dies. Then everyone looks at each other. No one takes responsibility.

Lawyer Gündoğdu wants the phone records of both the women and the male perpetrator to be examined. "Perhaps one reason they finished the case in such a short time was that the pain of those left behind bled deeper at every hearing. The night before the first hearing, the perpetrator submitted a petition saying 'they are going to kill me.' There is no such situation. In the second hearing, the court said 'there is intelligence,' gendarmes arrived. He has a 14-year-old son, his pain is much greater. The father involves him in his defense as well. He says 'they were filling my son against me, if I hadn't killed her, my son would be a father-killer,' but his son had already stayed with him for months, there was no such situation," she says.

Furthermore, lawyer Gündoğdu draws attention to this contradiction:

"The perpetrator said 'I loved my mother-in-law very much.' He always spoke of his wife whom he killed as 'Cano.' He said 'She is my Cano, I loved her very much.' However, there is the testimony of their upstairs neighbors that Tülay's back was always covered in bruises; he would torture her besides battering and beating her," she says.

To the question of "despite all these processes, why did the court not see it as premeditated murder," lawyer Gündoğdu responds, "Perhaps it is because it would have been proven that public officials did not do their duty."

In this case, the court has not yet announced its reasoned decision. Two women were killed in 19 seconds: Why did the court not say "premeditated"? We do not know.

We ask: How many more signs must a man give before killing a woman for a murder to be accepted as foreseeable in this country?

May a violence-free, free, and new week come.

The first number is:

Seven (7).

According to TurkStat statistics, this means that 1 in every 7 people is a young person. In other words, there are approximately 12.8 million young people aged 15–24 living in Turkey. At first glance, this may seem like a strong demographic advantage. We might assume, as is often stated, that a high concentration of young people creates an economic advantage. The energy, productive capacity, and transformative power of society are largely expected to come from young people. However, what truly matters is not the sheer size of the population but how young people are striving to exist within society.

This is where the second number comes into play.

Five (5).

This number relates to youth employment—or rather, the lack thereof. According to the “Youth in Statistics” report by TurkStat (2024), one in five young people in Turkey is neither in education nor employment (NEET). This is not merely an economic statistic; it is also a vulnerable area that erodes a sense of belonging. When viewed by gender, this figure rises to 30.1% among young women.

Habitat Association has published the “Report on the Well-Being of Youth in Turkey,” prepared to better understand young people’s living conditions, expectations, and well-being.

These findings, derived from face-to-face interviews conducted between October 9–24, 2025, with 1,403 young people aged 18–29 across 33 provinces, require careful consideration. Fifty-two percent of the young people surveyed are not working. Most importantly, even university graduates are unemployed. Among those who are employed, 60% are dissatisfied with their financial situation. Nearly all young people are living below the income they need.

University students clearly state that they need an income at the minimum wage level. Most students feel compelled to work. However, working while studying turns education into an endless shift. Many young people who want to work report that they cannot find part-time employment, and those who do find it say that opportunities for growth are limited. Housing and food expenses constitute a significant financial burden[1].

Young people losing hope

Due to cost constraints on social life, the young population primarily spends time at coffee shops/cafés (59%) and shopping malls (37%).

The number of those able to attend the theater or a concert remains at very low levels, just 2–4%. They are able to meet most of their socialization and cultural participation needs primarily through free or low-cost venues. For young people who cannot access any socio-cultural activities that allow them to express themselves, social media creates the effect of a free travel ticket. 95.7% of young people use social media, and the average daily usage time reaches five hours.

When you stack the findings of this study one on top of the other, the “technological escape” doesn’t come as a surprise. Another result the study highlights is the psychological burden on young people: About one in five reports suffering from insomnia or feeling exhausted. More importantly, 19% say, “I am unhappy.” We are talking about a generation that feels unhappy during the most carefree period of life. Economic uncertainty and debt conditions are directly increasing psychological pressure.

Interviews conducted by the Istanbul Planning Agency with young people reveal that the primary cause of anxiety is the barriers to accessing quality jobs—seen as the first step toward entering the workforce. Young people say that during the job search process they began with hope, they have lost their expectations of merit-based opportunities and, moreover, have lost their belief that they can find a job. Finding a job is turning into a source of uncertainty rather than an expectation, making it difficult for young people to make plans for the future. As a result, the percentage of young people who have lost hope is steadily increasing.

Disconnection from Life

The most unfortunate consequence of this fragility regarding life satisfaction and future expectations is the rising rate of youth suicide. This is precisely the issue we need to discuss most in Turkey.

Indeed, the suicide rate among those aged 15–39 stands at 7.38. Experts studying this issue cite “poverty and a lack of future prospects; hopelessness and helplessness regarding the resolution of problems” as primary causes of the significant rise in suicide rates in recent years.[2] While every suicide case has its own unique dynamics, rather than viewing this increase in isolation, we must examine the impact created by the socio-economic conditions we currently face.

As sociologist Émile Durkheim noted in his 1897 classic work "Suicide", suicide is not merely an individual act but a phenomenon produced by social conditions.

Durkheim explains the individual’s detachment from values and norms during periods marked by economic crises, rapid social change, and uncertainty about the future through the concept of “anomie.”

He argues that the most tragic manifestation of this disconnection is anomic suicide. When society experiences economic crises or sudden structural transformations, or when the society’s regulatory power weakens, the individual becomes unable to know what to hope for or what to reasonably expect; the gap between desires and possibilities widens, and life loses its meaning. The rise in suicide rates among young age groups observed in Turkey today must be understood precisely within this framework: concerns about making ends meet, unemployment, the inability to secure a future despite education, and the erosion of a sense of justice and meritocracy point to a collective picture of anomie in which young people find themselves.

A study on youth life satisfaction conducted in European Union member states generally confirms the pattern that youth is the happiest age group. This study evaluates eight different categories, including material living conditions, employment, education, leisure time, and relationships. In this table, where the European average is 7.6/10, young people in Turkey score 5.6/10, placing them below the average. [3]

All these diverse research findings provide a robust framework for understanding the situation of the young people we work with, create alongside, and encounter in various aspects of life during this period.

The generational issue facing young people in Turkey is not a temporary phenomenon but a structural problem. From the perspective of institutions, data should not be viewed merely as an observation but should also be taken as a call to action.

Developing comprehensive approaches that involve young people in decision-making processes, create inclusive employment opportunities, support their physical and psychological well-being, and expand their learning and development opportunities is now a critical need. As the Icelandic Mode[4] shows us, today’s “happy youth” did not arrive at this position by chance but reached it through conscious policy design.

Iceland, which was grappling with issues such as high rates of substance abuse, depression, and youth involvement in crime, began by first identifying the problem. It developed inclusive policies starting at the local level to support young people’s self-development. A strong social support network and quality educational opportunities ensure that young people feel safe and happy. It offers extensive opportunities for individual development. And the result is the world’s most peaceful country[5].

Could the Youth Employment Initiative be a solution?

In Turkey, as this article is being written, the Youth Employment Initiative project draft is expected to become law. This project, which aims to encourage young people to enter the workforce, targets young people aged 18–25 who are not enrolled in any university. The salaries of the hired young people will be covered directly by the state for six months. In addition to the salary support, employers will receive social security contribution support for 18 months.

Under this framework, businesses that hire eligible young people will receive salary and contribution support through the Unemployment Insurance Fund. However, it is noted that these supports will only apply to private-sector workplaces operating in the manufacturing sector. At first glance, this project raises doubts as to whether its true aim is to support young people or to support capital investments in the manufacturing industry. While Iceland’s program offers a data-driven infrastructure accessible to everyone with a youth-focused scope, this project has prioritized capital investment.

In the program, where it is unclear whether university-educated young people are included in the scope[6], the employer is provided with a worker at zero cost for a clear 24-month period. In this context, the young person is likely to receive only the minimum wage. Furthermore, the employer’s obligation to retain the worker is unclear.

Thus, we can reasonably assume that the young person’s job will likely end once the support ends. The fact that it covers only the manufacturing sector also presents a perspective that is out of touch with Turkish reality. (ÖB/EMK/VK)

When I first landed in İstanbul all those moons ago, I was intoxicated by the noise, the atmosphere, the winding streets which İlber Ortaylı so lovingly writes about in Discovering Ottomans and whose history you can still feel under your feet. The roads that Fahim walked down in the last years of the Ottoman Empire (Mister Fahim Abdulhak Sinasi Hisar). But this is not Turkey, it is the glitter but down dusty roads lays places steeped in history that are forgotten or ignored. If İstanbul is the beating heart, then these places are the veins which now require intensive care.

It was to this that Saturday I arrived in Çarşamba for a book signing at the annual book fair. The bus dropped us on the main road and we regrettably walked the remaining distance. The people were holding together but the place was struggling, with building showing signs of disrepair. The centre needing some love and tenderness, the place appeared neglected by the powers that be. These people deserve better.

At the book signing I encountered only love, care and interest as each person, family, couple I spoke to drifted past lighting up my day. The children who couldn’t believe an English man was here. Many cast doubts on their own country in almost lyrical tones. I expressed how lucky and beautiful this country and its people are. Some couldn’t understand why a foreigner would want to live here, which saddened me. 

At one point a middle-aged woman who declared herself as old spoke with such glee and happiness. “I can’t get enough of books.” Her husband had died a number of years ago, she then discovered reading and books. The midnight lamp burning through the night in her village house, a personal library that was growing. She spoke of worlds opening to her. That my book now sits on her shelf brings tears to my eyes.

There may not have been urban sophistication here but it had an abundance of honesty and openness, their horizons are not closed of far from it.

Around each town, city in Turkey lay such places, laws unto themselves, grave stones close to road sides or near where they live, never moving away even in death. But the tentacles of crude industrial expansion are reaching the gates of all of these places, "disposable" people and communities. 

I’m quite sure the old middle-aged woman will read and do something about it; she now knows a thing or two.

You can read about my life in Turkey here. 

As cards are being reshuffled around the world, Pashinyan certainly intends to slowly untie the moorings without a complete break. However, it must be acknowledged that the maneuverability of a small and poor country, especially in such a world, is not easy at all.

Bureaucratic preparations for the start of direct trade between Turkey and Armenia were completed as of May 11, as part of steps taken within the framework of the normalization process ongoing since 2022.

Technical and bureaucratic work continues regarding the opening of the common border between the two countries.

With the new regulation, it has become possible for goods going from Turkey to Armenia via a third country, or arriving via the same route, to have their final destination or point of origin written as "Armenia/Turkey."

Masis Kürkçügil, a Armenian writer and publisher from Turkey, emphasized that the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations should now be read not only on the level of bilateral relations but through the power balances in the South Caucasus.

According to Kürkçügil, the closure of the border and the freezing of relations between the two countries were directly linked to the Karabakh issue. Kürkçügil says that today, conditions have "changed radically" due to both Russia's weakening regional influence following the invasion of Ukraine and Azerbaijan's strengthening position on the ground.

'A result of Karabakh resolution in favor of Azerbaijan'

How do you assess the commencement of direct trade between Turkey and Armenia and the ongoing technical preparations for opening the border? On the one hand, this is a process that has been on the agenda for years; but how might the taking of concrete steps this time affect the regional balance of power in the South Caucasus? And in your view, in what ways does the current stage differ from previous normalization efforts?

The closure of the border was a decision taken by Ankara regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Considering the internal unrest in Azerbaijan, Russia’s undisputed power in

the region, and other factors at the time, conditions today have changed radically. Russia, particularly due to its quagmire in the invasion of Ukraine, has severely damaged its military prestige. In contrast, Azerbaijan has begun to assert its influence in the region with the support of Israel and Turkey. Armenia, on the other hand, is ultimately a small and impoverished country. Additionally, there remains an unresolved power struggle between the pro-Russian faction and the current administration, which seeks to act more independently.

The opening of the border is a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue being resolved in the manner desired by the Aliyev administration. Ankara was already conducting its relations with Armenia entirely under Baku’s shadow. The Karabakh issue has been resolved. Armenia, feeling trapped, is trying to catch its breath.

Is is truly 'normalization'?

How might progress in Turkey-Armenia normalization affect Azerbaijan’s regional position and its relations with Armenia? Are the boundaries of normalization still defined along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border?

With Iran being weakened by U.S. imperialism, Azerbaijan may feel even more empowered. After all, its ally is Israel! Turkey-Armenia normalization is entirely dependent on Baku’s will. To what extent can the opening of the border be considered “normalization”? This is debatable. Of course, the fundamental issue lies in the relationship between Baku and Yerevan. From the very beginning, Ankara has not harbored any intention of acting as an independent variable or a mediator or facilitator. For Turkey, there is no issue under discussion other than the “genocide” issue. Of course, millennia-old Central Asian dreams may sound appealing; but much has changed in those lands since the 1990s.

For many years, Armenia was viewed as a country dependent on Russia in the areas of security, border control, energy, and the economy. How does the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations and Armenia’s increased engagement with the West challenge Russia’s traditional role in the South Caucasus?

Just how much security this provides became clear when 120,000 people were forced to flee from Nagorno-Karabakh. Energy dependence is quite serious; Armenia meets two-thirds of its needs from Russia, and Russian “influence” is widespread. On the other hand, compared to, say, Azerbaijan or a number of countries with a similar history, politics in Armenia is relatively more reasonable. It’s not even necessary to describe the Azerbaijani regime.

Armenia has a peculiar diaspora. It thus has direct ties to the West. Despite having no colonial past, it is among the Francophone nations. In other words, its relationship with the West is, in a sense, inevitable—it is already a de facto reality. Most of its population is already in the diaspora. Especially after independence, due to poverty, nearly half of the population at that time scattered to the four corners of the world in search of work. Armenia’s remaining under Russian influence holds significance for Russia’s regional hegemony; but the cost of this has begun to weigh heavily on Armenia. Of course, Russia’s traditional role in the South Caucasus also grants it a natural right to this. It is certain that this will be used not for the benefit of the region’s peoples, but for the Russia envisioned by Putin. While one might say it has returned to Georgia, it is important to remember that behind Russia’s influence in the region, the local oligarchs are deeply intertwined with Russia.

'Seeking ways to breathe'

How do the multifaceted relations that Armenia has developed simultaneously with Russia, Iran, Turkey, the U.S., and the EU point to a “policy of balance” that goes beyond traditional alliance patterns? In this context, how should we interpret the strategic orientation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration?

Armenia holds no trump card for either regional or international policy. Consequently, rather than pursuing a balancing act, it is seeking ways to breathe. The cost of Russian influence has been heavy. It must be noted immediately that Pashinyan did not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; he opposed it. In contrast, the Nagorno-Karabakh administration at the time supported the invasion. Indeed, when Putin condemned Zelenskyy’s participation in the European Political Community meeting with a fury that defied diplomacy, Pashinyan reiterated this stance. Economic difficulties do not allow for an immediate severing of old ties, but these old economic ties are not lifting Armenia out of poverty either.

On another front, how might the tensions Pashinyan faces domestically with church circles and certain nationalist actors affect this search for a new direction in foreign policy?

There is no point in drawing a distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Unlike many leaders in the region, Pashinyan is not from the old state apparatus or the military; he came to power backed by a significant popular movement and strong social support. The church, and especially former Karabakh-based leaders, along with the oligarchs, operate primarily under Moscow’s shadow.

As the cards are being reshuffled worldwide, Pashinyan naturally intends to loosen the ropes gradually without making a complete break. However, one must acknowledge that the maneuvering capacity of a small and impoverished country—especially in such a world—is by no means easy. 

(TY/VK)

This structural problem came under scrutiny after the Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change Ministry fined Rize's Fındıklı Municipality 2,346,000 liras on Apr 22, 2026, for “dumping waste in an open area.”

The data shows that the issue is not unique to Fındıklı. Many districts along the Eastern Black Sea line, particularly Ardeşen, Arhavi, Borçka, Hopa, Kemalpaşa, Çamlıhemşin, and Pazar, have been forced to accumulate waste in open areas for many years. Defined in literature as "wild storage," this method involves leaving waste in nature in an uncontrolled manner without environmental precautions.

A search for a regional solution: TRABİKAP

Initially, solid waste from Trabzon was disposed of at a storage site in Sürmene between 2007 and 2008. However, this site was eventually decommissioned due to capacity issues and environmental impacts.

In 2014, the Trabzon and Rize Provinces Local Administrations Solid Waste Facilities Construction and Operation Union (TRABİKAP) was established to dispose of solid waste from Trabzon and Rize. This organization, of which municipalities are members, aimed to centralize scattered waste dumping and transition to a regular storage system. Within this framework, the system was gradually shifted to an integrated facility established in Araklı.

The established system is not a conventional incineration and energy production plant. Waste is primarily collected, sorted, and disposed of through regular storage methods. The operating model is based on a mixed structure where the municipal union and private firms are intertwined.

Today, TRABİKAP operates as a municipal union with 29 members. However, this structure does not cover many districts located in the eastern part of the Eastern Black Sea.

TRABİKAP did not respond to our questions despite three phone calls. We were told, "An authorized person will call you," but no return call was made.

‘It must be a public investment’

Ercüment Şahin Çervatoğlu of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), who has served as the mayor of Fındıklı since 2019, believes the issue transcends party politics.

"Waste was being stored wildly during the previous AKP administration, as well as during the former ANAP and SHP periods," Çervatoğlu said. He noted that the cost of incineration and energy conversion plants starts at a minimum of 25 million euros, making it impossible to cover such expenses from the municipal budget.

The municipality's request for land to establish a composting facility was not met by the government. Pointing out that current waste management practices result from necessity, Çervatoğlu summarized their efforts:

"When we took office in 2019, we considered how much we could reduce wild storage and formed committees. We quickly established a 1,000-square-meter indoor packaging waste collection facility for household waste. We began collecting recyclable household waste like paper, cardboard, metal, and plastic separately. In the next stage, we set up cages in the district. We tried to collect all PET bottles there.

"In 2019, we requested land for composting; they did not grant it. This area needs to be far from residential zones. We need public land for this. I even requested land again recently. On the day they issued the fine, the response came saying they cannot provide it.

"Citizens say, 'My land is in a hollow, dig it up and fill it so I can use it.' This is not legal, but we have no other solution. I am not saying this to justify it; I am also stating our shortcomings. It is not composting, but it is more benign. For instance, we do not pile it up in one spot like wild storage. If there is no state intervention, it is a pity for the Black Sea."

“13 ton çöpü iki kamyonla nereye götüreyim?”

Noting that 13 tons of waste is generated in the district daily, Çervatoğlu explained that they have resorted to roundabout bureaucratic methods to find solutions because the system is not functioning:

“We requested vehicles from the Environment Ministry, but they have not provided even a single car for years. Then we tried to find a workaround. Rize Special Provincial Administration made a protocol with the municipality. We sell our trash to Rize, and Rize sells it to TRABİKAP. We pay around 3,000 liras per ton.

"The transfer station operates during working hours but does not work on weekends or holidays. Or they say, ‘Our space is full, do not bring trash.’ Where am I supposed to take the 13 tons of trash generated daily with only two trucks? If Fındıklı Municipality is a part of this state, it does not matter where it stands politically; this is our shame, the state’s shame. I am also a part of that state. What should we do, stop collecting trash?”

Trash dumped on mountaintops and roadsides for 20 years

Hopa Mayor Utku Cihan, who was elected from the CHP in the 2024 local elections, also said that the problem is not new.

Emphasizing that the "wild storage" issue has persisted for about 20 years, Cihan said, “With the wild storage method, trash is left on roadsides, in empty areas, and on mountaintops. Unfortunately, our storage area is by the sea and the road, but this problem also exists in inland districts. For example, Artvin Municipality also takes its trash to a place on a mountaintop and burns it.”

Hopa Municipality’s attempts to join TRABİKAP have so far been inconclusive. Saying that sending trash to TRABİKAP is very logical in terms of logistics, Cihan noted he had applied to the institution one month after being elected mayor: “We said, ‘We want to send our trash to you.’ They said, ‘You must be a member of the union to send trash.’ So we wrote to the union. The union wrote back to us saying, ‘We currently have no expansion vision.’ But unfortunately, because they do not accept us, we have to put our trash in the same area.”

‘We are searching for a site’

While there is a local government union aimed at solving the solid waste problem of Artvin and its surrounding district municipalities together. However, Cihan says it has been unable to produce a solution to the problem for various reasons: 

“The Çoruh Basin Development Union (ÇOKAB) was established in 2007. It applied for a European Union project. Funding was secured. At that time, the Mayor of Oltu was the president of the union, and mostly AKP municipalities were involved. Unfortunately, it could not progress in building a recycling facility and failed to produce a solution. Currently, the Mayor of Artvin is the president of ÇOKAB. 

“We signed a protocol with Artvin Çoruh University through ÇOKAB. First, we tried to determine the method—whether an incineration plant is suitable or a recycling and composting facility. We are looking for a site where there will be no leakage, no harm to the environment, no wind, and it will not be close to residential areas. After that, we will look for investment. We are trying to speed up this process.”

Cihan noted that the Special Provincial Administration is responsible for collecting trash in villages: 

“They collect it, but where do they take the trash? They bring it to our dump. If a fine is to be issued to me, it should also be issued to the Special Provincial Administration. The most important criterion for these facilities is to be far from living areas. 

“However, there is no possibility of being far from a living area within municipal boundaries. Outside municipal boundaries, the municipality has no authority. Who has the authority? If the state does not step into this matter, it is not possible to solve it anyway. I have written 19 land allocation requests so far. They did not give me a single square meter of land; they did not give it to anyone. 

“For a recycling facility to be viable, about 100-150 tons of waste needs to be processed. In the whole of Hopa, we only have 25 tons of waste daily. That is why it is necessary to include Arhavi, Borçka, Kemalpaşa, and other districts and to act together.”

Ataselim: 20 yıl kaybedildi

Ataselim said unions established in the past have remained dysfunctional and believes the problem has been delayed:

"Sanitary landfilling is also a type of wild storage. A waste sorting system is an absolute necessity. I was a member of the municipal council for three terms. Now I am the mayor. If mayors had worked smartly at the time, for example, if a cooperative had been established, this problem would have been solved. 

"I was a member of the Kaçkar Fire Brigade, Slaughterhouse, and Solid Waste Union; I left. My reason for leaving was that they said for 15 years they would establish a waste treatment system but did not take a single step. Now I am a member of ÇOKAB. No one took responsibility and said, 'Let's solve this.' No one should be offended, but the fault lies with the mayors. Just as we need water and sewage, we also need a waste sorting system. If we do not do this, we will destroy the Black Sea."

They are working to establish a facility in Arhavi that will provide waste storage and energy production simultaneously, Ataselim noted, while warning that the problem cannot be overcome without a regional solution.

‘Sending garbage to Trabzon is not a solution’

Enver Atagün, who was elected from the CHP as the mayor of Ardeşen, Rize, in 2024, said serious disruptions occur even when waste is sent to transfer stations in Trabzon, the nearest sanitary landfill area.

They transport the waste from Ardeşen to Yomra in the adjacent province of Trabzon, Atagün said, adding, "The storage area there is full. On the other hand, neither the transportation cost nor the disposal fee is reasonable at all. From time to time, the facility is not available; sometimes, waste cannot be accepted at the transfer station due to personnel issues or other reasons. As a result, we are forced to dump the trash on top of the area that was previously a dump site."

Emphasizing the lack of financing and planning at the point of solving the problem, Atagün said that establishing a large-scale sorting and storage facility is not a project that municipalities can handle on their own.

Atagün further pointed out that establishing the facility at a single point could also create new problems:

"Doing it in one place also creates problems. Let's say such a facility is established in Ardeşen; the waste from the line extending to Hopa, Borçka, and Rize will be stored here. This would cause a local reaction due to reasons like traffic and smell. People would ask, 'Why are we storing another district's trash?' That is why I think solutions are needed on a district basis.

"Today, transportation and fuel costs are very high. It is important to collect waste by sorting it at home, at least reducing it this way and utilizing those that can be used for recycling. But as a society, we are not at this level. I have been mayor for two years, but I have not made such an attempt."

'Nowhere else but riverside' to store dump

Ercan Orhan, who was elected from the CHP as the mayor of Borçka in 2024, summarized the situation:

"We dispose of our trash through wild storage on the banks of the Çoruh, outside of Borçka. There is no other choice. Trash from 41 villages comes there. We fill it with soil. We talked to Erzurum and Trabzon but could not get a positive response. There is a settlement across from the disposal site. They are disturbed. the region has not been looked after. Politicians have not looked after it either. Municipalities have not been able to come together, or even if they have, they have not been able to produce a full solution."

Solid waste management in the Eastern Black Sea has existed for over 30 years as a problem that exceeds the capacity of local administrations and requires regional coordination. However, it is observed that the system does not function in an integrated manner. In its current state, municipalities try to dispose of waste largely through their own means and with fragmented and temporary methods. The waste is not eliminated; it only changes location. Therefore, the problem remains as an environmental issue that has gone unnoticed or even been taken for granted for years.

Assessments made by local administrators from different political positions intersect at a common point: In a model where the central administration is not directly involved, it does not seem possible to solve the trash problem in the Black Sea permanently.

(FG/TY/VK)

The İstanbul Barometer research for April found that 88.8% of participants are very concerned about school attacks. An additional 6.5% said they are partially concerned, while 4.7% reported no concern.

According to the data, 96.3% of women stated they are very concerned compared to 81.2% of men.

The survey followed two rare school shootings in the country’s southeast last month that left nine people dead, including children, and dozens more injured.

Nine killed in second school shooting in Turkey in two days

15 April 2026

When asked about the causes of school violence, 63.2% of respondents pointed to a lack of communication within families. This was followed by deficiencies in education policies at 39.3% and the influence of social media and harmful digital content at 36.1%.

Other factors identified by participants included inadequate security measures at schools (20.6%), socioeconomic inequalities (14.1%), and peer bullying (11.5%). A further 7.4% cited a lack of psychological support and preventive programs for children.

The impact of digital media was a significant theme in the findings. While 57.6% of participants believe social media and digital content trigger such attacks, 31.4% said these platforms are influential but not the sole factor.

The IPA report concluded that public perception of school violence is multifaceted, linking the issue to a combination of domestic relationships, education policies, digital environments, and broader social inequalities.

Parents in Maraş concerned about sending children to schools after shootings

17 April 2026

(NÖ/VK)

Following Turkey on the global list are Argentina at 30.9%, Haiti at 22.9%, and Malawi at 20%.

Turkey holds the highest food inflation rate in Europe. Its rate is approximately 3.5 times higher than that of Ukraine, which recorded 9.7% food inflation despite its ongoing war with Russia. Other European countries following Ukraine include North Macedonia at 8%, Romania at 7.39%, Norway at 6.6%, and both Moldova and Belarus at 6.3%.

Fourteen times higher than EU average

The gap is even wider when compared to European Union averages. The annual food inflation rate was 2.4% for the EU and 2.2% for the Eurozone. Turkey’s food inflation is roughly 14 times the EU average and 16 times the Eurozone average.

Among its neighbors, Turkey ranks second only to Iran. While prices in Turkey rose by 34.55%, they increased by 105% in Iran. Other neighboring countries report significantly lower rates, including Armenia at 9.5%, Georgia at 7.5%, Azerbaijan at 6.8%, Bulgaria at 5.7%, Greece at 4.4%, and Iraq at 1.5%. Excluding Iran, the average food inflation among Turkey’s neighbors is approximately 5.9%.

Agricultural policies among primary causes

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations noted in its recent evaluation that currency depreciation has significantly impacted food prices in Turkey. The FAO report highlighted that increases in the costs of seeds, pesticides, and energy are largely driven by the declining value of the lira.

Internal economic and agricultural policies are identified as primary drivers of these high rates. The depreciation of the lira has directly increased the cost of essential agricultural inputs such as diesel, fertilizer, feed, seeds, and energy.

Climate crisis at the table, market regime in the fields

14 February 2026

Agricultural subsidies are also cited as insufficient. Under the Agriculture Law, subsidies should not be less than 1% of the gross national product. However, the 168 billion liras allocated for agricultural support in 2026 represents only about 0.27% of the 63.2 trillion liras national income projected for 2025. This indicates that the support provided to farmers remains below the legally mandated level.

Producer costs continue to fuel persistent inflation. According to TurkStat data from Feb 2026, the agricultural input price index rose by 31.55% annually. In Mar 2026, the agricultural producer price index increased by 36.09%. These figures suggest that price hikes are not merely occurring at the retail level but are driven by pressures in production and logistics.

Number of registered farmers further decreases, MP warns

7 May 2026

Government efforts to combat food inflation have largely focused on short-term measures, such as inspections of supermarket chains, temporary discount calls, seasonal import decisions, or export restrictions. Analysts suggest that permanent price reductions would require policies that reduce producer costs, ensure predictable income for farmers, strengthen cooperatives, and improve irrigation and storage infrastructure. (HA/VK)

Kurdish Language Day is observed today, May 15, marking an event celebrated annually since 2007.

The day commemorates May 15, 1932, when Kurdish intellectuals and linguists led by Celadet Ali Bedirxan and Rewşan Bedirxan began publishing Hawar (The Cry) in Damascus, which, as the first Kurdish magazine to use the Latin alphabet, played a central role in the standardization of written Kurdish.

Various events are organized every year on May 15 to draw attention to the obstacles and bans regarding Kurdish language. These events call for necessary regulations to ensure Kurdish becomes a language of education and commerce.

Message from artists

Kurdish musicians Rotinda, Tara Mamedova, Kasım Taşdoğan, Helin Kılıçarslan, Serdar Canan, Ruken Yılmaz, Pîroz, and Eylül Nazlıer, along with theater actor Erdal Kaya and dance artist Serhat Kural, issued a call for May 15 Kurdish Language Day.

The message, read out in parts by the artists, called for Kurdish to be integrated more into daily life.

"Assimilation policies targeting Kurdish have been carried out in Turkey for years. Let us read in Kurdish, write in Kurdish, and live in Kurdish. Let us keep Kurdish alive not just in songs, but at home, on the street, and in every area of life. Kurdish must be the language of education, the street, and the market. Our language is not just a tool for communication; it is our identity, our honor, and our memory. Let us say together: Our language is our existence, our language is our identity!"

(AY/VK)

Ata, a former MP for the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), was detained on Oct 26, 2016, during a public statement in front of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, which the government had taken over from the HDP at the time. Following her detention, the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation into Ata on charges of "founding or managing a terrorist organization."

Prosecutors cited Ata’s activities within the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), an umbrella group for pro-Kurdish and leftist organizations, her participation in meetings and demonstrations, her speeches, and her social media posts as evidence. Ata was also accused of being a leader of the shuttered Free Women’s Congress (KJA) and engaging in "terrorist propaganda."

On Oct 30, 2016, the Diyarbakır 1st Peace Judgeship ordered her arrest. She remained in custody for more than five months before her release on May 4, 2017.

Ata applied to the ECtHR on the grounds that her detention lacked a legal basis and that she was targeted for political reasons.

ECtHR rules Kurdish politician Aysel Tuğluk’s detention was politically motivated

14 October 2025

The ruling

The European court ruled on May 12 that there was no concrete evidence to justify Ata's detention, finding violations of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression. The court noted that the charges were based on democratic activities that did not involve calls for violence.

"Reasonable suspicion" required for detention was not established with concrete evidence, the court said. It noted that local courts failed to form a clear link between Ata’s words and the alleged crimes, merely listing her political statements and attendance at meetings.

European court finds 2019 ruling for Demirtaş’s 2019 detention arbitrary

8 July 2025

The court found a violation of Article 5/1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It also ruled that Article 5/3 of the ECHR was violated because the decisions to prolong her six-month detention lacked sufficient reasoning. The court noted that authorities failed to demonstrate a risk of flight or tampering with evidence, or why alternative measures like judicial control were inadequate.

The ECtHR further concluded that Ata’s detention constituted an interference with her freedom of expression, leading to a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. The court held that an unlawful detention cannot be considered a legitimate restriction on free speech. (AEK/VK)

The İstanbul Anadolu 2nd Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights Penal Court ruled today that Şık’s articles and social media posts, which warned of health risks associated with certain bee and herbal products, constituted "unfair competition" against SBS Bilimsel Bio Çözümler Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş., the company that owns the BEE'O trademark.

bianet was among the defendants because of publishing Şık's articles and Gerçek Gündem of covering the dispute between Şık and the company.

The court ordered the defendants to pay 50,000 liras in material damages and a symbolic 1 lira in moral damages.

The court also ruled that commercial interest would be applied to the fine starting from May 2022 and ordered the removal of the articles and posts in question.

The dispute

The dispute dates back to Sep 2021, when Şık's article titled "Honey and pollen may pose health risks for children" was published on bianet.

In the article addressing the widespread use of herbal products during the Covid-19 pandemic, Şık argued that marketing products like pollen, herbal teas, and oregano water as "natural" or "traditional" does not automatically guarantee safety, due to the possible presence of toxic pyrrolizidine alkaloids in products.

Although the article did not name any firm, BEE’O sent a formal letter to bianet requesting the removal of the piece, which was not complied with.

The legal dispute expanded in May 2022 after Şık alleged on social media that the food product review website Gıda Dedektifi was running undisclosed advertisements for BEE’O. The website had previously been fined for such advertisement activities.

Gıda Dedektifi and BEE'O responded Şık's allegations, accusing him of creating a negative perception for the brand. BEE'O released analysis results of certain products, which showed no pyrrolizidine alkaloids were detected in the tested items.

In response, Şık wrote an article on bianet titled "Answer to Gıda Dedektifi and BEE'O firm." He argued that the promotional texts on the site were misleading and that the analysis reports published by BEE’O in response to his claims did not mean that production processes were transparent.

After this article was published, the company sued Şık, bianet, and the Gerçek Gündem news outlet, which had reported on the dispute.

Researcher Bülent Şık acquitted in trial for revealing ministry's cancer data

18 April 2025

The hearing

During the hearing, Büşra Özdemir, the company's lawyer, demanded Şık be sentenced, arguing that his intention was to defame the company.

Şık’s lawyer, Abbas Yalçın, argued for the dismissal of the case. "My client wrote these articles with the aim of protecting public health and child health," Yalçın said.

Lawyer Bilge Batur, representing Gerçek Gündem, stated that reporting on matters of public health is in the public interest and did not constitute a violation.

The court, without issuing a break, sentenced the defendants, partially accepting the complaining party's requests.

The justified decision will be released in the coming days. The defending side will appeal the decision.

'Punishment of public health'

Speaking to journalists after the hearing, Şık criticized the ruling., describing it as "punishment of public health."

Şık noted that during his time on the Turkish Medical Association (TTB) pandemic committee, he observed a rise in herbal products being marketed with claims that they "fight the virus" or "strengthen immunity."

Şık said in his articles on bianet, he had specifically warned about toxic compounds called pyrrolizidine alkaloids found in pollen and honey, which can have toxic effects on the liver. He emphasized that risks are higher for children, pregnant women, the elderly, and those with chronic illnesses.

"We are not saying companies should not produce products," Şık stated. "If a product has the potential to cause health harm, especially for sensitive groups, it is the most natural right of consumers to know this."

Şık also highlighted a lack of regulation in Turkey regarding the marketing of bee products to children. He noted that while European authorities conduct national screenings for toxic compounds in such products, Turkey lacks sufficient oversight.

"Products that should not be sold to small children are recommended on websites. There is no regulation or control over this," he said.

(HA/VK)

Justice Minister Akın Gürlek announced the operation on social media, saying, "A heavy blow has been dealt to a multi-layered criminal organization that targeted the peace of our nation and our economy."

The investigation determined that 100 billion liras, (~2.2 billion US dollars), in criminal proceeds were laundered within the financial system. Gürlek said the findings were based on Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) reports as well as evidence gathered through technical and physical surveillance.

Dozens detained in İstanbul over alleged money laundering linked to illegal betting

11 November 2025

Yesterday, Kütahyalı quoted a social media post by Minister Gürlek regarding a separate illegal betting operation in Düzce, writing, "All illegal betting gangs will be finished."

Kütahyalı is a well-known political and football commentator who regularly appears on national television and digital media to discuss current affairs. A vocal supporter of the government who has been a polarizing figure in Turkish media for over a decade, Kütahyalı describes himself as a "sometimes spin doctor" in his social media profile. He is also a staunch fan of Galatasaray.

Authorities have launched a series of criminal investigations into betting activities since last year. The investigations have targeted numerous club managers and players from the Süper Lig and lower leagues, including several high-profile figures, who were arrested on charges of money laundering and match-fixing linked to illegal betting.

Referees, club president detained as Turkey's betting probe expands to potential match-fixing

7 November 2025

Only five companies authorized by the state are legally allowed to provide betting on sporting events in Turkey. The illegal betting sector is estimated to be significantly larger, with platforms frequently advertising on pirated movie and match streaming sites, occasionally featuring celebrity appearances.

Celebrities detained in illegal betting probe

11 November 2024

(HA/VK)

The verdict hearing was attended by defense lawyers and representatives from civil society organizations, while Hacıoğlu was not present in the courtroom.

During the hearing, the prosecutor reiterated their earlier opinion requesting that the journalist be punished on charges of membership in a terrorist organization.

Defense lawyers called for Hacıoğlu's acquittal, arguing the case was based on her professional journalism activities. Attorney Resul Temur stated the accusations lacked merit and emphasized that his client was merely performing her job as a journalist.

Hacıoğlu was initially detained in Van on Jan 17, 2025, during house raids conducted as part of an İstanbul-based investigation. She was formally arrested on Jan 20 on charges of membership in a terrorist organization and was later released pending trial during the first hearing on Jun 13.

BIA Media Monitoring Reports

13 December 2024

'I stand behind and every word I said'

Following the ruling, Hacıoğlu released a statement on social media. "I stand behind every report I made and every word I said. You cannot cover up the truth with the sentences handed down," she wrote.

Hacıoğlu further criticized government policies and the judicial system in her statement:

"Journalism is not a crime; it is a crime to pit this country and these peoples against each other, to attack, to arrest, to plunder nature, to carry out inhuman practices in prisons, to isolate a person by cutting off their communication—their most basic right—to usurp the will of the people, and to leave harassment and rape unpunished."

"We will continue to stand against this, to report on it, and to follow in the footsteps of our colleagues who paid a price for the TRUTH! Because we have a belief in the TRUTH that we know will have a magnificent end."

(HA/VK)

While the number of single-person households and single-parent families is on the rise, the proportion of extended families continues to decline.

Following the Presidency’s declaration of 2025 as the "Year of the Family," the government has designated 2026-2035 as the "Decade of Family and Population." Additionally, the final week of May has been established as "National Family Week" to be celebrated annually.

Households are shrinking

According to Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS) data, the average household size in Turkey, which was 4 people in 2008, fell to 3.08 in 2025.

Şırnak was the province with the highest average household size at 4.84 people, while Dersim had the lowest at 2.49 people.

Single-person living becoming more common

The proportion of single-person households, which was 13.9% in 2014, rose to 20.5% in 2025. Gümüşhane had the highest concentration of people living alone at 32.7%, while Batman ranked last at 11.5%.

The proportion of nuclear families also showed a decline. The rate, which was 67.4% in 2014, fell to 62.7% in 2025. Meanwhile, the proportion of extended families decreased from 16.7% to 13.5%.

Increase in single-parent families

The proportion of households consisting of a single parent and children has increased significantly in recent years. The rate, which was 7.6% in 2014, rose to 11.3% in 2025. Families consisting of a mother and children made up 8.5% of these households.

Bingöl was the province with the highest concentration of single-parent families at 13.8%.

One in four households includes an elderly person

According to 2025 data, 26.1% of households in Turkey include at least one elderly individual. Elderly people living alone accounted for 33.2% of single-person households.

The vast majority of elderly people living alone were women, with the rate recorded at 73.5%.

Some 70% of never-married individuals in the 25-29 age group live with their mother and/or father. According to TÜİK data, the share of men within this group was 42.6%, while the share of women was 27.4%.

Consanguineous marriage is declining

The rate of marriage between relatives in Turkey continues its downward trend. The rate, which was 5.9% in 2010, fell to 3% in 2025.

However, rates remained high in some provinces. Şanlıurfa ranked first at 16.9%, followed by Mardin and Siirt.

According to the results of the Life Satisfaction Survey, 69% of individuals stated that their family makes them the happiest. Children ranked second at 15.6%.

Divorces and children

In 2025, 193,793 couples divorced following finalized court cases. A total of 191,371 children were affected by this process. Custody of 74.6% of the children was granted to the mother.

Poverty higher in extended families

According to the income and living conditions survey, 27.1% of extended families live below the poverty line. The overall poverty rate in Turkey was announced as 20.6%.

Housing problems persist

In 2025, 28.8% of the population reported experiencing housing problems such as leaking roofs, damp walls, or rotten windows. The proportion of those experiencing heating problems was 27.9%, while the rate of those complaining about environmental pollution was 22.1%. (EMK/VK)

The charges stem from Arı’s news reports and social media commentary. Arı was detained during a house raid on Mar 21 and remains in pretrial detention.

News subject to accusations

Arı’s statements regarding President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s family members serving on the boards of foundations such as TÜGVA, TÜRGEV, and İlim Yayma Cemiyeti formed the basis for the charge of spreading misleading information. Arı had reported that public resources are channeled to these organizations and that they benefit from tax exemptions.

Prosecutors also included Arı’s posts concerning a dorm construction project at the İstanbul İmam Hatip High School in Fatih where President Erdoğan graduated. Arı had reported that the dormitory construction had begun on Treasury land that included registered cultural assets.

Regarding the news, the indictment used a statement from the Presidential Communications Directorate's Center for Combating Disinformation (DMM) as evidence against Arı. The center had labeled the report as "clear disinformation."

BIA Media Monitoring Reports

13 December 2024

Arı's post about a 630 million liras corruption investigation involving the Yunus Emre Foundation was also included in the indictment. Regarding this report, the prosecution charged Arı with violating confidentiality, noting that the Ankara 2nd Penal Court of First Instance had issued a restriction order on the investigation on Dec 23, 2024.

The prosecution is seeking one to three years for spreading misleading information and an additional one to three years for violating confidentiality.

Erdoğan family and foundations

During a broadcast on BirGün TV, Arı commented on the involvement of the Erdoğan family in various foundations.

"The Erdoğan family manages around 20 foundations," Arı claimed. Erdoğan's children Bilal and Sümeyye Erdoğan, and his spouse Emine Erdoğan are on the boards of many of these foundations, he said.

"The most important thing is that public resources can be mobilized for these foundations. They say, 'These foundations operate for the public benefit.' Because of this status, they argue it is normal and not a crime for municipalities, public institutions, and governorates to allocate buildings or buses, or provide other economic and financial contributions.

"In recent years, we saw that a very large portion of the dormitory buildings of these foundations were actually public buildings belonging to municipalities, or that municipalities rented them from individuals and allocated them to these foundations. This is a very significant resource. We can say that millions or billions of liras are involved here."

Arı had also reported on allegations of "fake invoices" and irregular payments causing financial loss to the Yunus Emre Foundation. Two separate indictments were previously filed against 23 suspects in that case involving approximately 400 million liras in irregularities. (HA/VK)

The new regulations allow goods transported from Turkey to Armenia through third countries, or vice versa, to list Turkey or Armenia as the final destination, Keçeli said in a written statement.

The move is part of a rapproachment process between the two countries that has been ongoing since 2022.

Keçeli emphasized the significance of the current developments in the process:

"In light of the historic opportunity to strengthen lasting peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus, Turkey will continue to contribute to the development of economic relations in the region and to further advancing cooperation for the benefit of all countries and peoples in the region."

Technical and bureaucratic work regarding the opening of the shared land border is still underway, Keçeli added. (TY/VK)

The defendant, Cihat Koçhan, was convicted of kidnapping the dog, named Lucy, from the garden of her home in June 2025 and committing the assault.

During the third hearing of the case yesterday, a witness testified to seeing the incident from a balcony at around 5.00 am. The witness stated they clearly saw Koçhan assaulting Lucy in the garden in front of his residence and recorded the act.

The court concluded that the sexual assault had taken place based on the evidence presented. The judicial fine was set at 60,000 liras.

Although lawyers requested that the defendant receive the maximum possible sentence, the court opted for a lower penalty.

Sena Şengün, a lawyer from the İstanbul Bar Association Animal Rights Center, said the ruling was far from establishing justice. (TY/VK)